Appeal No. 2002-1505
Application No. 09/004,254
Rather than reiterate the conflicting viewpoints advanced by the examiner and
appellants regarding the above-noted rejections, we make reference to the examiner's
answer (Paper No. 9, mailed Jun. 13, 2001) for the examiner's reasoning in support of
the rejections, and to appellants’ brief (Paper No. 7, filed Feb. 6, 2001) and reply brief
(Paper No. 10, filed Aug. 16, 2001) for appellants’ arguments thereagainst.
OPINION
In reaching our decision in this appeal, we have given careful consideration to
appellants’ specification and claims, to the applied prior art reference, and to the
respective positions articulated by appellants and the examiner. As a consequence of
our review, we make the determinations which follow.
35 U.S.C. § 102
To support a rejection of a claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), it must be shown that
each element of the claim is found, either expressly described or under principles of
inherency, in a single prior art reference. See Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713
F.2d 760, 772, 218 USPQ 781, 789 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026
(1984).
It is well settled that the burden of establishing a prima facie case of anticipation
resides with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d
1468, 1472, 223 USPQ 785, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Appellants argue that the examiner
has not set forth a prima facie case of anticipation since Fukui does not teach the
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