Appeal No. 2004-1134
Application No. 09/928,204
amplifier stage 43 carries out fine tuning of the brightness
factor, and second amplifier stage 44 carries out white
compensation and coarse tuning of the brightness compensation
(page 5, lines 13-16). Hence, the examiner’s argument is
incorrect.
The examiner argues that “[a]lthough Suzuki does not
expressly mention the reversal of stages of the two-stage
amplifier (meaning that the first amplifier stage would control
the brightness compensation and the second amplifier stage would
control the white balance) it would have been obvious to one with
ordinary skill in the art to do so because the input and output
of the first and final stages, respectively, in either setup,
would come from and lead to their same respective locations”
(final rejection mailed January 14, 2003, paper no. 9, page 4).
For a prima facie case of obviousness to be established, the
teachings from the prior art itself must appear to have suggested
the claimed subject matter to one of ordinary skill in the art.
See In re Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048, 1051, 189 USPQ 143, 147 (CCPA
1976). The mere fact that the prior art could be modified as
proposed by the examiner is not sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of obviousness. See In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260,
1266, 23 USPQ2d 1780, 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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