Appeal No. 2004-1439 Page 5
Application No. 10/044,142
This reasonable expectation of success is enough to support a prima facie case of
obviousness in the context of the present case given the various uses for such structures
known in the prior art. See In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 904, 7 USPQ2d 1673, 1681 (Fed.
Cir. 1988)(“For obviousness under § 103, all that is required is a reasonable expectation of
success.”).
As a final point, we note that Appellant bases no arguments upon objective evidence
of non-obviousness. We conclude that the Examiner has established a prima facie case of
obviousness with respect to the subject matter of claims 25-27, 29, 31, 32, 34, and 36-38
which has not been sufficiently rebutted by Appellant.
The Rejection of Claim 28 over Ivanovich in view of Price
Claim 28 requires that the panel of claim 25 be a single panel. The Examiner has
interpreted this language as excluding the unitary configuration of the tent of Ivanovich. It is
not clear to us that the claim is so limited. By the ordinary meaning of the words, the claim
merely requires that the panel described in claim 25 be one panel. In other words, that
described panel cannot itself be made up of a plurality of panels. The claim is silent with
regard to any other panels and how they are attached. Nothing in the specification is
inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the terms “single panel.” Ivanovich describes a
floor 10 meeting the requirements of the panel of claim 25. Floor 10 is but one panel.
Even assuming that the claim has a more limited meaning which excludes the floor
structure of Ivanovich, we cannot agree with Appellant that there was reversible error by the
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