Interference 103,781
The short answer is that Adang was accorded the opportunity
to file a request to file a motion for judgment and additional
discovery, but it failed to do so. In its belated request to
file a motion for judgment under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)/103 in view
of Barton’s invention and discovery, Adang failed to show good
cause for its initial failure to file a timely request. It was
not an abuse of discretion to deny the belated request. Credle
v. Bond, 25 F.3d at 1572 n.14, 30 USPQ2d at 1916 n.14.
That the APJ did not abuse its discretion is apparent from
the record. Following the redeclaration of the interference,
with Barton reinstated as a junior party (Paper No. 148), the APJ
ordered all parties to the interference, and set reasonable time
periods for all the parties, to (1) specify what additional
preliminary motions were required as a result of the interference
being redeclared with Barton as a junior party, and (2) explain
why those motions were necessary (Paper No. 148). In responding
to that order, and in its subsequent request for reconsideration
of decisions relating to that order, Adang did not specify any
motion under 37 CFR § 1.633(a) for discovery and judgment that
Fischhoff’s claims designated as corresponding to the
interference count are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)/103
in view of the possible prior invention thereof by Barton. Nor
did Adang explain why a motion under 37 CFR § 1.633(a) for
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