Ex Parte Shi et al - Page 9


               Appeal No. 2004-2047                                                                                                  
               Application 09/817,419                                                                                                

               cook time is about 20 to about 40 minutes, and fully cooked berries have a moisture content of                        
               from about 44-51%.                                                                                                    
                       Whitney again notes the inherent disadvantages in batch processes (col. 3, ll. 25-28 and                      
               40-42), and points out the continuous cooking process “is more easily controlled and the                              
               undesired variations in degree of cook and hydration within and between batches . . .  can be                         
               substantially reduced . . . [and] provides the opportunity to more accurately and precisely control                   
               the degree of cook and produce a uniform population of cooked berries” (col. 3, ll. 29-40).                           
               Whitney describes the a variety of vessels that can be used for the continuous process in addition                    
               to the cooking vessels of Whitney FIG. 1 (col. 3, l. 35, to col. 6, l. 14).  In the sole Example,                     
               wheat berries having a moisture content of “320°C [sic, 32%]” were continuously treated at                            
               98°C for 28 minutes, and the product is described as “[f]ully cooked wheat” (col. 6, ll. 17-37).                      
                       The principal issue with respect to the ground of rejection under § 102(b) (answer, e.g.,                     
               pages 3 and 5-6) is whether the teachings and inferences that one skilled in the art would find as                    
               a matter of fact in the disclosure of Whitney, taken as a whole, with respect to the disclosed                        
               process of continuously cooking grains containing starch by heating in water at the specified                         
               temperature “for a period of time sufficient to substantially fully cook said grain,”2 would have                     
               described the claimed invention of appealed claims 1 and 11 through 13 within the meaning of                          
               this statutory provision.  In this respect, it is well settled that the examiner has the burden of                    
               establishing a prima facie case of anticipation under§ 102(b) in the first instance by pointing out                   
               where, as a matter of fact, each and every element of the claimed invention, arranged as required                     
               by the claim, is described identically in a single reference, either expressly or under the                           
               principles of inherency, in a manner sufficient to have placed a person of ordinary skill in the art                  
               in possession thereof.  See generally, In re Spada, 911 F.2d 705, 708, 15 USPQ2d 1655, 1657                           
               (Fed. Cir. 1990).  “When the PTO shows sound basis for believing that the products of the                             

                                                                                                                                    
               2  It is well settled that a reference stands for all of the specific teachings thereof as well as the                
               inferences one of ordinary skill in this art would have reasonably been expected to draw                              
               therefrom, see In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264-65, 23 USPQ2d 1780, 1782-83 (Fed. Cir.                               
               1992); In re Preda, 401 F.2d 825, 826, 159 USPQ 342, 344 (CCPA 1968); In re Aller, 220 F.2d                           
               454, 458-59, 105 USPQ 233, 237 (CCPA 1955), presuming skill on the part of this person.  In re                        
               Sovish, 769 F.2d 738, 743, 226 USPQ 771, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1985).                                                        

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