Ex Parte Scott - Page 6




             Appeal No. 2005-0254                                                          Page 6              
             Application No. 10/197,012                                                                        



             to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made from the teachings         
             of Murison.                                                                                       


                   For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the examiner's determination              
             of the obviousness of the one-piece printer ribbon spool limitation has not been                  
             supported by any evidence6 that would have led an artisan to arrive at the claimed                
             invention.  In our view, the only suggestion for modifying Murison in the manner                  
             proposed by the examiner in the rejection before us in this appeal to meet the one piece          
             printer ribbon spool limitation stems from hindsight knowledge derived from the                   
             appellant's own disclosure.  The use of such hindsight knowledge to support an                    
             obviousness rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is, of course, impermissible.  See, for               

                   6 Evidence of a suggestion, teaching, or motivation to modify a reference may               
             flow from the prior art references themselves, the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in          
             the art, or, in some cases, from the nature of the problem to be solved, see Pro-Mold &           
             Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573, 37 USPQ2d 1626, 1630                  
             (Fed. Cir. 1996), Para-Ordinance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Importers Int'l., Inc., 73 F.3d 1085,          
             1088, 37 USPQ2d 1237, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 80 (1996),                  
             although "the suggestion more often comes from the teachings of the pertinent                     
             references," In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355, 47 USPQ2d 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir.                  
             1998).  The range of sources available, however, does not diminish the requirement for            
             actual evidence.  A broad conclusory statement regarding the obviousness of modifying             
             a reference, standing alone, is not "evidence."  Thus, when an examiner relies on                 
             general knowledge to negate patentability (such as making plural elements into a single-          
             piece assembly), that knowledge must be articulated and placed on the record.  See In             
             re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1342-45, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1433-35 (Fed. Cir. 2002) and In re                
             Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999, 50 USPQ2d 1614, 1617 (Fed. Cir. 1999).                              








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