Appeal No. 2005-1059 Page 4
Application No. 09/836,045
the appellant, does not meet the “including [defining] two spaced apart, generally
parallel surfaces” language in independent claims 1, 14, 24, 25, 28 and 36. The
appellant’s position in this regard is not well taken. We agree with the examiner that the
single-wall structure of each of the divider walls of the applied references does include
two spaced apart, generally parallel surfaces. Specifically, the opposite faces of the
walls are generally parallel surfaces which are spaced apart by the thickness of the wall.
Inasmuch as all of the appellant’s arguments as to why the references applied in
the anticipation rejections do not anticipate the subject matter of claims 1-39 are
grounded on the appellant’s unsound position, discussed above, that the “two spaced
apart, generally parallel surfaces” limitation is not met, they do not persuade us that the
examiner’s anticipation rejections are in error. It follows that we shall sustain these
rejections.
The Obviousness Rejections
As noted above, the appellant’s argument in the brief and reply brief has failed to
persuade us that any of the claims on appeal is not anticipated by each of the
references applied in the anticipation rejections. A disclosure that anticipates under 35
U.S.C. § 102 also renders the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103, for
"anticipation is the epitome of obviousness." Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1529, 220
USPQ 1021, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See also In re Fracalossi, 681 F.2d 792, 794, 215
USPQ 569, 571 (CCPA 1982); In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402, 181 USPQ 641,
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