Appeal No. 2005-2619
Application No. 09/734,826
rest on a factual basis with these facts being interpreted without hindsight reconstruction
of the invention from the prior art. The examiner may not, because of doubt that the
invention is patentable, resort to speculation, unfounded assumption or hindsight
reconstruction to supply deficiencies in the factual basis for the rejection. See In re
Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017, 154 USPQ 173, 177 (CCPA 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1057 (1968). Our reviewing court has repeatedly cautioned against employing
hindsight by using the appellant's disclosure as a blueprint to reconstruct the claimed
invention from the isolated teachings of the prior art. See, e.g., Grain Processing
Corp. v. American Maize-Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 902, 907, 5 USPQ2d 1788, 1792 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
When determining obviousness, “the [E]xaminer can satisfy the burden of
showing obviousness of the combination ‘only by showing some objective teaching in
the prior art or that knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art would
lead that individual to combine the relevant teachings of the references.’” In re Lee,
277 F.3d 1338, 1343, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 2002), citing In re Fritch,
972 F.2d 1260, 1265, 23 USPQ2d 1780, 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “Broad conclusory
statements regarding the teaching of multiple references, standing alone, are not
‘evidence.’” In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999, 50 USPQ2d 1614, 1617 (Fed. Cir.
1999). “Mere denials and conclusory statements, however, are not sufficient to establish
a genuine issue of material fact.” Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999-1000,
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