Ex Parte Yagi et al - Page 3




               Appeal No. 2006-1872                                                                                                
               Application No. 09/769,376                                                                                          
                   We sustain the rejections that rely upon Sugawa as evidence of unpatentability.  We,                            
               however, do not sustain the rejection over Kon.  Our reasons follow.                                                


                                                            OPINION                                                                
               The Obviousness-type Double Patenting Rejection over Sugawa                                                         
                       The double patenting doctrine generally prevents a patentee from receiving two patents                      
               for the same invention.  Perricone v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 432 F.3d 1368, 1372, 77 USPQ2d                          
               1321, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  The proscription against double patenting takes two forms:                            
               statutory and non-statutory.  Id.  Statutory, or  “same invention” double patenting is based on the                 
               language in § 101 of the Patent Act mandating “a patent” for any new and useful invention. 35                       
               U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  Id. at 1372-73, at 1323.  Non-statutory, or “obviousness-type,” double                        
               patenting is a judicially created doctrine adopted to prevent claims in separate applications or                    
               patents that do not recite the “same” invention, but nonetheless claim inventions so alike that                     
               granting both exclusive rights would effectively extend the life of patent protection.  Id.  The                    
               question is whether the differences in subject matter between the rejected claims and the patented                  
               claim are such that there is no patentable distinction between them.  Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr                     
               Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 968, 58 USPQ2d 1865, 1878 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  If the rejected claims                      
               are anticipated by, or merely define an obvious variation of, the invention claimed in the Sugawa                   
               patent, there is no patentable distinction.  Id.; see also In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441, 164 USPQ                 
               619, 622 (CCPA 1970).                                                                                               
                       We agree with the Examiner that the differences between the rejected claims and                             
               patented claim 1 are such that there is no patentable distinction between them.                                     


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