Appeal No. 2006-1882
Application No. 10/431,617
Claim 1 as a representative claim of Group I;
Claim 9 as a representative claim of Group II; and
Claim 16 as a representative claim of Group III.
I. Whether the Rejection of Claims 1-8 Under 35 U.S.C. § 102 is proper?
It is our view, after consideration of the record before us, that the disclosure of
Raffel does fully meet the invention as recited in claims 1-8. Accordingly, we affirm.
It is axiomatic that anticipation of a claim under § 102 can be found only if the
prior art reference discloses every element of the claim. See In re King, 801 F.2d 1324,
1326, 231 USPQ 136, 138 (Fed. Cir. 1986) and Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v.
American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1458, 221 USPQ 481, 485 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
With respect to independent claim 1, Appellants argue at page 5 of the brief and
page 3 of the reply, claim 1 is patentable because the IDLE of Raffel is comparable to
the step of camping in claim 1. Thus, Raffel’s step 33 of Fig. 9 (corresponding to the
claimed searching step) does not have camping as a prerequisite as required by claim
1. We disagree. Appellants provide no evidence and point to nothing in the record to
support their position that camping must be read as the IDLE function of Raffel. To the
contrary, we find at pages 4-5 of Appellants’ specification that “camping” appears to be
a broad term meaning that the mobile station is locked onto a visited public land mobile
network. Such locking is shown at step 34 of Fig. 9 of Raffel.
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