1. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823).
The property of a charitable corporation chartered by the Crown, being specifically protected by the treaty of peace of 1783, an act of Vermont adopted in 1794 and purporting to convey such property to local subdivisions was void.
2. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
By reason of conflict with the federal licensing act of 1793 authorizing vessels to navigate coastal waters, a New York statute granting to certain persons an exclusive right to navigate New York waters was void.
3. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
A Georgia law which imposed penalties on white persons who, without first obtaining a license therefor, established a residence within the limits of the Cherokee Nation, was unenforceable by reason of conflict with treaties negotiated by the United States with such Indian tribes and by virtue of extending to an area beyond the jurisdiction of the State.
4. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
A Pennsylvania statute (1826) which penalized an owner's recovery of a runaway slave was violative of Art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, and federal legislation implementing the latter provision.
Justices concurring: Story, Catron, McKinley, Taney, C.J. (separately), Thompson (separately), Baldwin (separately), Wayne (separately), Daniel (separately), McLean (separately).
5. Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151 (1845).
Inasmuch as under federal acts ceding to Pennsylvania that part of the Cumberland Road within its limits, and Pennsylvania laws accepting the same, the carriage of mail over said road was to be free from toll, later Pennsylvania law imposing tolls on coaches transporting passengers could not extend to the mail carried therein.
Justices concurring: Taney, C.J., Story, Wayne, Catron, McKinley, Nelson.
Justices dissenting: McLean, Daniel.
6. Neil, Moore & Co. v. Ohio, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 720 (1845).
Ohio toll levied on passengers transported on mail coaches traversing Cumberland Road in that State, but which exempted passengers traveling on other coaches, was void by reason of conflict with the terms of federal and Ohio acts adopted in relation to transfer and acceptance of said part of the road by Ohio.
2347
Justices concurring: Taney, C.J., Story, McLean, Wayne, Catron, McKinley, Nelson.
Justice dissenting: Daniel.
7. Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227 (1860).
An Alabama statute requiring owners of steamboats navigating the waters of that State to register under the penalty of a $500 fine for each offense was in conflict with the act of Congress providing for the enrollment and license of vessels engaged in the coastwise trade and therefore inoperative.
Accord: Foster v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 244 (1860), which held that this statute also was inoperative when applied to a lighter and a towboat assisting the movement wholly within Alabama territorial waters of vessels engaged in foreign and interstate commerce.
8. Van Allen v. The Assessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573 (1866).
A New York law authorizing localities to tax as personal property national bank stock held by residents, but which imposed no comparable tax on shares of state banks, was violative of federal legislation authorizing state taxation of national bank stock at rates no higher than those imposed on state bank shares. Taxation of the capital of state banks did not provide such equality, for that part of the capital of state banks invested in federal securities was exempt.
Justices concurring: Grier, Davis, Nelson, Clifford, Miller, Field.
Justices dissenting: Chase, C.J., Wayne, Swayne.
9. Accord: Bradley v. Illinois, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 459 (1867), voiding a similar Illinois tax law on the ground that a tax on the capital of state banks was not the equivalent of the state tax on shares of national banks and accordingly the tax on the latter was in conflict with federal law consenting to taxation of national bank shares at rates not in excess of those imposed on shares of state banks.
10. The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867).
A California statute vesting state courts with in rem jurisdiction over vessels for causes of action cognizable in admiralty invalidly infringed the admiralty jurisdiction exclusively conferred upon federal courts by § 9 of the Judiciary Act.
11. The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867).
Iowa statute providing an in rem remedy in state courts for maritime causes of action was void by reason of conflict with § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which vested admiralty jurisdiction exclusively in the federal courts.
12. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867).
When a treaty with Indian tribes exempted their lands from levy, sale, and forefeiture, Kansas could not validly collect its tax on lands held in severalty by members of such tribes under patents issued them pursuant to such treaty. Tribal Indians thus recognized by the National Government are exempt from the jurisdiction of the State.
13. The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1867).
A New York statute imposing a tax on lands reserved to an Indian tribe by treaty was void, notwithstanding provision therein that sale of land for nonpayment of the tax would not affect the right of occupancy by the Indians.
14. Bank v. Supervisors, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 26 (1868).
New York tax could not be collected on United States notes expressly exempted from state taxation by federal law authorizing their issuance as legal tender.
15. The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624 (1869).
Inasmuch as a shipper's lien under a contract of carriage between ports within the same State is a maritime lien enforceable by in rem proceedings exclusively within the admiralty jurisdiction of federal court, an Alabama law creating a maritime lien enforceable by in rem proceedings in its own courts was void.
16. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878).
Florida legislative grant of a telegraphic monopoly held "inoperative" as in conflict with a congressional act dealing with the construction of telegraph lines and based on its commerce and postal power.
Justices concurring: Waite, C.J., Clifford, Strong, Bradley, Swayne, Miller.
Justices dissenting: Field, Hunt.
17. Sprague v. Thompson, 118 U.S. 90 (1886).
Georgia law requiring out-of-state coastal vessels, subject to certain discriminating exemptions, to take on a pilot upon entering Georgia ports, was void by reason of conflict with federal pilotage law.
18. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U.S. 530 (1888).
Massachusetts law, authorizing an injunction to restrain tax delinquents from doing business until payments are made, could not be validly invoked to restrain a telegraph company operating lines over United States military and post roads pursuant to federal authorization.
19. Harman v. City of Chicago, 147 U.S. 396 (1893).
A Chicago ordinance imposing a license tax on tug boats licensed under federal authority and engaged in interstate commerce held invalid.
20. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98 (1895).
Texas statute regulating railroad rates, when applied to interstate freight transportation, was held to conflict with Interstate Commerce Act.
21. Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899).
Ohio statute which regulated the use of oleomargarine in the
State held void as applied to a soldiers' home in Ohio created by Congress and administered as a federal institution.
22. Home Savings Bank v. City of Des Moines, 205 U.S. 503 (1907).
An Iowa law levying a tax on a state bank, assessed on its shares measured by the value of its capital, surplus, and individual earnings, was void insofar as the assessment embraced federal bonds owned by the bank and was in conflict with a federal enactment exempting such bonds from state taxes.
Justices concurring: Moody, Brewer, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day.
Justices dissenting: Fuller, C.J., Harlan, Peckham.
23. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Washington, 222 U.S. 370 (1912).
Consistent with doctrine of national supremacy and preemption, state laws, including one of the State of Washington, regulating hours of service embracing employees of interstate carriers, became inoperative immediately upon the adoption of the Federal Hours of Service Law notwithstanding that the latter did not go into effect until a year after its passage.
24. Southern Ry. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424 (1912).
A North Carolina statute requiring carriers to transport interstate freight as soon as it was received was unenforceable due to conflict with § 2 of the Hepburn Act of 1906 (34 Stat. 584), forbidding interstate railway carriers to make shipments until rates had been fixed and published by the Interstate Commerce Commission, which had not yet acted on this matter.
Justices concurring: McKenna, Holmes, Hughes, Van Devanter, Lamar, White, C.J..
Justice dissenting: Lurton.
Accord: Southern Ry. v. Reid & Beam, 222 U.S. 444 (1912).
Accord: Southern Ry. v. Burlington Lumber Co., 225 U.S. 99 (1912).
25. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Hardwick Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 426 (1913).
Congress, by enactment of the Hepburn Act (34 Stat. 584 (1906)) having preempted the field of regulation pertaining to the duty of carriers to deliver cars in interstate commerce, a Minnesota Reciprocal Demurrage Law imposing like regulations was void.
26. Accord: St. Louis, I. Mt. & S. Ry. v. Edwards, 227 U.S. 265 (1913).
Arkansas Demurrage Law of 1907 penalizing carriers for failure to notify consignees of arrival of shipments was similarly held void.
27. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913).
A Kentucky law which precluded an interstate carrier from contracting to limit its liability to an agreed or declared value was void as conflicting with the Carmack Amendment, which preempted the field of regulation pertaining to the liability of interstate carriers for loss and damage to interstate shipments,.
28. Accord: Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Miller, 226 U.S. 513 (1913).
An Iowa law and a provision of the Nebraska Constitution were held to have been superseded by the Carmack Amendment.
29. Accord: Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. v. Latta, 226 U.S. 519 (1913).
Nebraska constitutional provision was held to have been superseded by the Carmack Amendment.
30. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
Wisconsin food labeling law was invalid insofar as it exacted labelling requirements as to articles in interstate commerce which were in conflict with those required under the Federal Pure Food and Drug Act. imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce.
31. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Harriman Bros., 227 U.S. 657 (1913).
Inasmuch as the federal Carmack Amendment preempted the field of regulation pertaining to determination of an interstate railroad's liability for loss or damages to goods in transit, Texas law outlawing contractual stipulations specifying a period of limitations for filing of claims by a shipper which was briefer than that sanctioned by the federal law was unenforceable.
Justices concurring: Lurton, McKenna, Holmes, Hughes (separately), Day, Van
Devanter, Lamar, White, C.J.. Justice dissenting: Pitney.
32. St. Louis, S. F. & T. Ry. v. Seale, 229 U.S. 156 (1913).
When the Federal Employers' Liability Act was applicable, by reason that the injured employee was engaged in interstate commerce, a Texas law affording a remedy for said injuries was superseded by reason of the supremacy of the former.
Justices concurring: Van Devanter, McKenna, Holmes, Day, Lurton, Hughes, Pitney, White, C.J.. Justice dissenting: Lamar.
33. New York Central R.R. v. Hudson County, 227 U.S. 248 (1913).
Congress having expressly included ferries used in connection with interstate railroads in its legislation regulating interstate commerce, two New Jersey municipal ordinances fixing passenger rates for travel on ferries between New Jersey and New York points were superseded and therefore invalid.
34. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Hall, 229 U.S. 511 (1913).
Iowa law pertaining to attachment of wages of a railroad worker adjudicated bankrupt within less than four months thereafter was in conflict with federal bankruptcy law nullifying liens obtained within four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy and hence was not entitled to full faith and credit in Nebraska courts.
35. Erie R.R. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671 (1914).
Congress having completely preempted the field by its Hours of
Service Act of 1907, notwithstanding that it did not take effect until 1908, a New York labor law of 1907 regulating hours of service of railroad telegraph operators engaged in interstate commerce was invalid.
36. Globe Bank v. Martin, 236 U.S. 288 (1915).
Attachments and liens on real estate of a bankrupt, acquired pursuant to Kentucky laws within four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy under federal law, were null and void, and distribution of the proceeds from the sale of such real estate was governed by federal rather than by state law.
37. Southern Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439 (1915).
An Indiana statute requiring railway companies to place grab- irons and hand-holds on the sides and ends of every car having been superseded by the Federal Safety Appliance Act, penalties imposed under the former could not be recovered as to cars operated on interstate railroads, although engaged only in intrastate traffic.
38. Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 568 (1915).
Kansas prohibition law could not be validly enforced to prevent
Kansas dealer from accepting orders for alcoholic beverages which were to be completed by interstate delivery to Kansas purchasers from a point in Missouri; under the federal Wilson Act the interstate transportation did not end until delivery to the consignee was completed.
39. Charleston & W. C. Ry. v. Varnville Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915).
South Carolina law which imposed a penalty on carriers for their failure to adjust claims within 40 days imposed an invalid burden on interstate commerce and also was in conflict with the federal Carmack Amendment.
40. Rossi v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 62 (1915).
Pennsylvania liquor law could not be enforced against one who solicited orders for the delivery of alcoholic beverages to be shipped to the consignee from another State; under the federal Wilson Act of 1890 liquor shipped in interstate commerce did not become subject to State regulation until after delivery to the consignee.
41. New York Central R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
Congress, by enactment of the Federal Employees' Liability Act, having preempted the field as to determination of the liability of interstate railroad carriers to compensate employees for injuries sustained while engaged in interstate commerce, award under New York Workmen's Compensation Act for injuries sustained in interstate commerce by railway employee could not be upheld.
Justices concurring: Van Devanter, Holmes, Pitney, McReynolds, Day, McKenna, White, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Brandeis, Clarke.
42. Accord: Erie R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170 (1917).
For the same reason, a New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act was held inapplicable to a railway worker injured while engaged in interstate commerce.
Justices concurring: Van Devanter, Holmes, Day, Pitney, McKenna, McReynolds, White, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Brandeis, Clarke.
43. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
New York Workmen's Compensation Act was unconstitutional as applied to employees engaged in maritime work, for it afforded a remedy unknown to common law, and hence was not among the common law remedies saved to suitors from exclusive federal admiralty jurisdiction by the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Justices concurring: McReynolds, Day, Van Devanter, McKenna, White, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Holmes (separately), Pitney (separately), Brandeis, Clarke.
Accord: Clyde S.S. Co. v. Walker, 244 U.S. 255 (1917).
Justices concurring: McReynolds, Day, Van Devanter, McKenna, White, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Holmes, Pitney, Brandeis, Clarke.
44. Accord: Steamship Bowdoin Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of California, 246 U.S. 648 (1918), as to the inoperative effect of a California Workmen's Compensation Act.
45. American Express Company v. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617 (1917).
Consistent with national supremacy, a South Dakota law regulating advance of interstate rates could not be applied to changes in intrastate rates which a carrier put into effect pursuant to an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission to abate discrimination against interstate traffic.
Justices concurring: Brandeis, Holmes, Pitney, McReynolds, Day, Clarke, Van
Devanter, White, C.J.. Justice dissenting: McKenna.
46. New Orleans & N.E.R.R. v. Scarlet, 249 U.S. 528 (1919).
Mississippi "Prima Facie" act, relieving plaintiff of burden of proof to establish negligence, could not constitutionally be applied by a state court in suits under the Federal Employees' Liability Act.
Accord: Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Mullins, 249 U.S. 531 (1919).
47. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566 (1919).
Pennsylvania law, as applied to an interstate train terminated by a mail car, forbidding operation of any train consisting of United States mail, or express, cars without rear end of car being equipped with a platform with guard rails and steps was inoperative by reason of conflict with federal legislation and regulations which preempted the field.
Justices concurring: Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney, McReynolds, Brandeis, White, C.J.. Justice dissenting: Clarke.
48. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Warren-Godwin Co., 251 U.S. 27 (1919).
By virtue of federal legislation preempting the field, Mississippi law could not be applied to determine validity of a contract by a telegraph company limiting its responsibility when its lower rate is paid for unrepeated interstate messages.
Justices concurring: Holmes, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, Clarke, White, C.J.. Justice dissenting: Pitney.
49. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315 (1920).
Federal legislation having preempted the field, Indiana law no longer was operative to subject a telegraph company to a penalty for failure to deliver promptly in Indiana a message sent from a point in Illinois.
50. Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Richmond, 256 U.S. 635 (1921).
Richmond, Virginia, ordinance and Virginia statute which, as construed, levied a tax on state and national bank shares at the aggregate rate of $1.75 per $100 of valuation and upon intangibles at the aggregate rate of 85 per $100 valuation, a substantial proportion of which property was in the hands of individual taxpayers, were void as in conflict with federal law prohibiting discriminatory taxation of national bank shares for the reason that the tax was imposed on the national bank stocks to the aggregate value of more than $8,000,000 whereas the value of state bank stocks taxed was only $6,000,000.
51. First Nat'l Bank v. California, 262 U.S. 366 (1923).
California law which escheated to a state bank deposits unclaimed for 20 years, notwithstanding that no notice of residence has been filed with the bank by the depositor or any claimant, was invalid as applied to deposits in national banks by reason of conflict with applicable federal law.
52. Bunch v. Cole, 263 U.S. 250 (1923).
When lease of an Indian allotment, made by the allottee in excess of the powers of alienation granted by federal law, is declared null and void by federal law, Oklahoma statute, as judicially applied, which gave the lease the effect of a tenancy at will and as controlling the amount of compensation which the allottee may recover for use and occupation by the lessees also was void, consistently with the principle of national supremacy.
53. Sperry Oil Co. v. Chisholm, 264 U.S. 488 (1924).
Oklahoma law which required that the execution of a lease on the family homestead also must be executed by the wife was inoperative, consistently with the principle of national supremacy, to the extent that under federal law Congress had empowered a Cherokee Indian to make an oil or gas lease on his restricted "homestead" allotment subject only to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.
54. Missouri ex rel. Burnes Nat'l Bank v. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17 (1924).
Because the Federal Reserve Act authorizes national banks to act as executors, a Missouri law was ineffective, under the principle of national supremacy, to withhold such powers from such banks.
Justices concurring: Holmes, Sanford, Brandeis, McKenna, Van Devanter, Butler, Taft, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Sutherland, McReynolds.
55. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
A Seattle ordinance which limited the pawnbroking business to citizens was void as applied to a Japanese alien lawfully admitted into the United States and protected by a treaty with Japan according to nationals of the latter country the right to carry on a "trade."
56. Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Stroud, 267 U.S. 404 (1925).
When carrier had two routes by which freight might move between two points in a State, the second of which was partly interstate, a suit against the carrier for discrimination in the furnishing of cars which arose out of use of the interstate route in conformity with the carrier's practice was governed by the Interstate Commerce Act, and the Missouri law governing such discrimination was superseded and inapplicable (Art. VI).
57. Lancaster v. McCarty, 267 U.S. 427 (1925).
Federal law (39 Stat. 441 (1916)) which authorized carriers to limit liability upon property received for transportation to value declared by shipper, where the rates were based on such value pursuant to authority of Interstate Commerce Commission, superseded Texas law in respect to a claim for damage to goods shipped intrastate between Texas points for the reason that the tariff and classification had been adopted by the carrier pursuant to an order of the Commission requiring it to remove discrimination against interstate commerce which had resulted from lower Texas intrastate rates.
58. Davis v. Cohen, 268 U.S. 638 (1925).
When the Federal Transportation Act of 1920 provided that suits on claims arising out of federal wartime control of the railroads might be brought against a federal agent, if instituted within two years after federal control had ended, Massachusetts law allowing amendments of proceedings prior to judgment, could not be invoked to substitute the Agent as defendant more than two years after federal control had ended; the suit in which the substitution was attempted had erroneously been filed against the railroad rather than against the Federal Director General during the period of federal control, and since the substitution amounted to filing a new action, invocation of the Massachusetts law was repugnant to the Federal Transportation Act's provisions as to limitations.
59. First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341 (1926).
As applied to national banks, Iowa tax law providing for a levy on shares of such banks at rates less favorable than the rates applied to moneyed capital invested in competition with such banks was repugnant to federal law prohibiting such discrimination (Art. VI).
60. Oregon-Washington Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926).
Federal legislation having preempted the field, a Washington law which established a quarantine against importation of hay and alfalfa meal, except in sealed containers, coming from areas in other States harboring the alfalfa weevil, was inoperative.
Justices concurring: Taft, C.J., Holmes, Van Devanter, Brandeis, Butler, Sanford, Stone.
Justices dissenting: McReynolds, Sutherland.
61. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
The Federal Boiler Inspection Act having occupied the field of regulation pertaining to locomotive equipment on interstate highways, a Georgia law requiring cab curtains and automatic fire box doors was preempted.
62. Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Porter, 273 U.S. 341 (1927).
Congress having occupied the field by its own legislation, an Arkansas law which prohibited carriers from incorporating into their bills of lading stipulations exempting the carriers from liability for loss of shipments by fire not due to the carriers' negligence was preempted.
63. First Nat'l Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548 (1927).
Wisconsin tax law, as imposed on shares of a national bank, was in conflict with federal law prohibiting state taxation of such shares at rates in excess of those levied on moneyed capital employed in competition with the business of such banks and was therefore inoperative as to the shares of said banks.
64. Accord: Minnesota v. First Nat'l Bank, 273 U.S. 561 (1927), holding inoperative for the same reason a Minnesota law taxing national bank shares.
65. Accord: Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Custer County, 275 U.S. 502 (1927), holding inoperative a similar Montana tax law.
66. Accord: Keating v. Public Nat'l Bank, 284 U.S. 587 (1932), holding inoperative for the same reason a New York tax law.
67. Montana Nat'l Bank v. Yellowstone County, 276 U.S. 479 (1928).
Montana law which levied tax on national bank shares was inconsistent with federal law prohibiting levy on such shares as rates higher than those assessed on moneyed capital in hands of individual citizens.
68. Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
Arizona game laws were not enforceable in a national game preserve and could not be invoked to prevent the killing of wild deer therein as ordered by federal officers acting under authority conferred by federal law.
69. International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
Arkansas insolvency law was superseded by the Federal Bankruptcy Act to the extent that a creditor of one who invoked the state laws was entitled to have his claim paid by the state receiver in conformity with the order of distribution sanctioned by the federal law.
Justices concurring: Butler, Holmes, Stone, Sanford, Van Devanter, Taft, C.J..
Justices dissenting: McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland.
70. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929).
Iowa inheritance tax law discriminating against nonresident alien heirs was violative of a treaty with Denmark.
71. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930).
Oklahoma law which imposed a 3% tax on the gross value of royalties from oil and gas was void as a tax on the right reserved to Indians as owners and lessors of the fee when applied to Indians who had received allotments exempted under the Atoka agreement and leased by them for production of oil and gas (Art. VI).
72. Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
The right of action given under the Federal Merchant Marine Act to the personal representative to recover damages on behalf of beneficiaries for the death of a seaman resulting from negligence was exclusive and precluded a right of recovery by reason of unseaworthiness predicated upon the death statute of Virginia, where the injury was sustained.
73. Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930).
Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act could not be invoked to obtain recovery for injuries sustained by a workman while painting angle irons in the engine room of a ship tied to a pier in navigable waters; recovery was controlled exclusively by federal maritime law.
Justices concurring: McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler, Van Devanter.
Justices dissenting: Stone, Holmes, Brandeis.
74. Accord: Employers' Liability Assurance Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 233 (1930).
Texas workman's compensation law inapplicable for the same reason.
Justices concurring: McReynolds, Butler, Sutherland, Van Devanter, Stone (separately), Holmes (separately), Brandeis (separately).
75. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931).
New York law pertaining to the descent of property of an alien decedent was inoperative as to the property of an alien by reason of the conflicting provisions of a treaty negotiated with the nation to which the decedent owed allegiance.
76. Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931).
Federal bankruptcy courts are empowered to sell the real estate of bankrupts free from liens for state taxes; lien laws of Ohio stipulating that the liens were to attach to the property were ineffective to prevent the federal court from transferring the liens from the property to the proceeds of the sale.
77. Henkel v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry., 284 U.S. 444 (1932).
Minnesota statute fixing amounts to be paid as compensation or in fees to expert witnesses could not be applied to determine costs in a federal court proceeding inasmuch as the statute was superseded by a federal enactment determining the fees to be paid witnesses.
78. Murray v. Gerrick & Co., 291 U.S. 315 (1934).
Washington Workman's Compensation Act, adopted after the
United States had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over a tract which became Puget Sound Navy Yard, could not be invoked by the widow and child of a worker fatally injured while working for a contractor in said Yard for the reason that Congress by law had consented only to the institution of suits by a personal representative under the Washington Wrongful Death Statute.
79. Jennings v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 294 U.S. 216 (1935).
Section of Indiana Bank Collection Code which purported to make the owners of paper which a bank had collected, but which it had not satisfied, preferred claimants in the event of the bank's failure, regardless of whether the funds representing such paper could be traced or identified as part of the bank's assets or intermingled with or converted into other assets of the bank, was inoperative as to a national bank by reason of conflict with applicable federal law.
80. Accord: Old Company's Lehigh v. Meeker Co., 294 U.S. 227 (1935), embracing a comparable New York statutory provision.
81. Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U.S. 113 (1935).
Pennsylvania law which levied a tax on trust companies was in conflict with provisions of federal law proscribing discriminatory taxation of national bank shares by virtue of deductions allowed trust company for amounts represented by shares owned in Pennsylvania corporations already taxed or exempted, without any corresponding deduction on account of nontaxable federal securities owned or on account of national bank shares already taxed.
Justices concurring: Roberts, Hughes, C.J., Van Devanter, Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland.
Justices dissenting: Cardozo, Brandeis, Stone.
82. Oklahoma v. Barnsdall Corp., 296 U.S. 521 (1936).
Oklahoma law which levied a tax on the gross production of oil, as applied to oil produced by lessees of lands of Indian tribes, was not authorized by a federal law consenting to levy of a different tax, and hence was inoperative as a tax on a federal instrumentality.
83. Lawrence v. Shaw, 300 U.S. 345 (1937).
North Carolina property tax law could not be enforced so as to levy a tax on bank deposits made by petitioner as guardian of an incompetent veteran of World War I; by the terms of applicable federal law bank deposits which resulted from the receipt of federal veterans benefits payments were exempted from local taxation.
84. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
A Pennsylvania alien registration statute, imposing requirements at variance with those set forth in the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940 containing a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of aliens, is rendered unenforceable by reason of conflict with federal legislative and treaty-making powers.
Justices concurring: Roberts, Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy.
Justices dissenting: Stone, Hughes, C.J., McReynolds.
85. Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95 (1941).
Inasmuch as the Federal Farm Loan Act exempts federal land banks from state taxes, other than those on property acquired in the course of dealings, the North Dakota sales tax cannot validly be collected on the sale of materials to a federal land bank to be used in improving real estate (Art. VI, cl. 2).
86. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
Consistently with the national supremacy clause, federal laws and regulations relating to the entire process of manufacture of renovated butter supersede state laws whereunder Alabama officials inspected and seized packing stock butter acquired by a manufacturer of renovated butter for interstate commerce.
Justices concurring: Roberts, Black, Reed, Douglas, Jackson.
Justices dissenting: Stone, C.J., Frankfurter, Murphy, Byrnes.
87. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
Being repugnant to the terms of a treaty concluded with the Yakima Indians reserving to the members of the tribe the right to take fish at all usual places in common with the citizens of Washington Territory, a Washington law requiring such Indians to pay license fees for the exercise of such privilege cannot be enforced.
88. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
Florida Statute of 1941, sec. 817.09 and sec. 817.10, made it a misdemeanor to induce advances with intent to defraud by a promise to perform labor, and further made failure to perform labor for which money had been obtained prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. The statute is violative of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Antipeonage Act for it cannot be said that a plea of guilty is uninfluenced by the statute's threat to convict by its prima facie evidence section.
Justices concurring: Roberts, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, Rutledge.
Justices dissenting: Stone, C.J., Reed.
89. Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
A Florida law providing that no one shall be licensed as a "business agent" of a labor union without meeting certain specified standards and that all labor unions in the State must file annual reports disclosing certain information and pay an annual fee circumscribes the "full freedom" to choose collective bargaining agents secured to employees by the National Labor Relations Act.
Justices concurring: Stone, C.J., Black, Reed, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, Rutledge.
Justices dissenting: Roberts, Frankfurter.
90. First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
An Iowa statute requiring a permit for construction of a dam in navigable waters is preempted to the extent that it purports to authorize a state veto of a hydro-electric project licensed by the Federal Power Commission pursuant to the Federal Power Act. While the Federal Power Act authorizes the Commission to require a licensee to comply with requirements of state law that are not inconsistent with federal purposes, these federal purposes may not be subordinated to state control through operation of the state permitting requirement.
Justices concurring: Burton, Stone, C.J., Black, Reed, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge.
Justice dissenting: Frankfurter.
91. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Employment Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
Where the National Labor Relations Board had asserted general jurisdiction over unions of foreman employed by industries subject to the National Labor Relations Act but had refused to certify such unions as collective bargaining representatives on the ground that to do so at the time would obstruct rather than further effectuation of the purposes of the Act, certification of such unions by the New York Employment Relations Board under a state act is invalid as in conflict with the National Labor Relations Act and the commerce clause of the Constitution.
92. Accord: Plankington Packing Co. v. WERB, 338 U.S. 953 (1950).
A decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court upholding a similar action by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board is summarily reversed.
93. Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
By amendments of the United States Warehouse Act, Congress terminated the dual system of regulation and substituted an exclusive system of federal regulations of warehouses licensed under the federal act. Such warehouses therefore no longer need to obtain Illinois licenses or comply with Illinois laws regulating those phases of the warehouse business which have been regulated under the federal act. Compliance with Illinois law is limited to those phases of the business which the federal act expressly subjects to state law.
Justices concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Reed, Douglas, Murphy, Jackson, Burton.
Justices dissenting: Frankfurter, Rutledge.
94. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118 (1948).
A South Carolina law providing that any railroad line within the
State must be owned and operated only by state-created corporations may not be applied to prevent a Virginia corporation, so authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission under § 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, from owning and operating an entire railway system with mileage in South Carolina.
95. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
California's requirement that every person bringing fish ashore in the State for sale obtain a commercial fishing license, but denying such a license to any person ineligible for citizenship, precluded a resident Japanese alien from earning his living as a commercial fisherman in the ocean waters off the State and was invalid both under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under federal statutory law (42 U.S.C. § 1981).
Justices concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge, Burton.
Justices dissenting: Reed, Jackson.
96. La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 18 (1949).
Certification by the state employment relations board under a
Wisconsin labor relations act of a union as the collective bargaining representative of employees engaged in interstate commerce is invalid as in conflict with the National Labor Relations Act; the employer is onenvalid as applied to deny utility employees the right to strike. As applied, the law conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act.
Justices concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Reed, Douglas, Jackson, Clark.
Justices dissenting: Frankfurter, Burton, Minton.
97. H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
Denial of a license under the New York Agricultural and Market
Law violated the commerce clause of the Constitution and the Federal Agricultural Marketing Act where the denial was based on grounds that the expanded facilities would reduce the supply of milk for local markets and result in destructive competition in a market already adequately served.
Justices concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Douglas, Jackson, Burton.
Justices dissenting: Black, Frankfurter, Murphy, Rutledge.
98. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
The California community property law could not be invoked to sustain an award to a deceased soldier's widow of one-half of the proceeds of an insurance policy issued under the National Life Insurance Act; the federal law accords the insured soldier the right to designate his beneficiary, in this instance, his mother, and his widow, not having been designated, is expressly precluded from acquiring a vested right to these proceeds.
99. New Jersey Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals, 338 U.S. 665 (1950).
Collection by a New Jersey taxing district of a tax on intangible property of a stock insurance company, computed without deducting the principal amount of certain United States bonds and accrued interest thereon was invalid by reason of conflict with federal law exempting federal obligations from state and local taxation.
Justices concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton, Clark, Minton.
Justice dissenting: Black.
100. United Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
The strike vote provision of the Michigan Mediation Law, which prohibits the calling of a strike unless a state-prescribed procedure for mediation is followed and unless a majority of the employees in a state-defined bargaining unit authorizes the strike, conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act and is invalid.
101. Bus Employees v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
The Wisconsin Public Utility Anti-Strike Law, which substituted arbitration upon order of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board for collective bargaining whenever an impasse is reached in the bargaining process, is invalid as applied to deny utility employees the right to strike. As applied, the law conflicts with the National Labor Relations Act.
Justices concurring: Vinson, C.J., Black, Reed, Douglas, Jackson, Clark.
Justices dissenting: Frankfurter, Burton, Minton.
102. Carson v. Roane-Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232 (1952).
Tennessee Retailers' Sales Tax Act could not be enforced as to sales of commodities to a contractor employed by the Atomic Energy Commission; the contractor's activities were those of the Commission and exempt under federal law.
103. Accord: General Electric Co. v. Washington, 347 U.S. 909 (1954), embracing exemption of a similar contractor from Washington business and occupation tax law.
104. Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322 (1953).
Where a serviceman domiciled in one State is assigned to military duty in another State, the latter state (here Colorado) is barred by § 514 of the Soldiers and Sailor's Civil Relief Act of 1940 from imposing a tax on his tangible personal property temporarily located within its borders, even when the State of his domicile has not taxed such property.
Justices concurring: Vinson, C.J., Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton, Clark, Minton.
Justices dissenting: Black, Douglas.
105. Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373 (1954).
Insofar as the New York Banking Law forbids national banks to use the word "saving" or "savings in their business or advertising," it conflicts with federal laws expressly authorizing national banks to receive deposits and to exercise incidental powers and is void.
Justices concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton, Clark, Minton.
Justice dissenting: Reed.
106. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
An Illinois law providing for a 90-day suspension of a motor carrier upon a finding of 10 or more violations of regulations calling for a balanced distribution of freight loads in relation to the truck's axles cannot be applied to an interstate motor carrier holding a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the Federal Motor Carrier Act. A State may not suspend the carrier's rights to use the State's highways in its interstate operations. The Illinois law, as applied to such carrier, also violates the commerce clause.
107. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
The Smith Act, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2385, which prohibits the knowing advocacy of the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence, supersedes the enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, which proscribes the same conduct. The scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that the Congress left no room for the States to supplement itenforcement of state sedition acts presents a serious danger of conflict with the administration of the federal program.
Justices concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark, Harlan.
Justices dissenting: Reed, Burton, Minton.
108. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
A "right to work" provision of the Nebraska Constitution cannot be invoked to invalidate a "union shop" agreement between an interstate railroad and unions of its employees for the reason that such "union shop" agreement is expressly authorized by § 2(11) of the Railway Labor Act.
109. Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956).
An Arkansas statute requiring licensing of contractors cannot be applied to a federal contractor operating pursuant to a contract issued under authority of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947.
110. Guss v. Utah Labor Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
The Utah Labor Board, acting pursuant to Utah law, may not exercise jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving an employer engaged in interstate commerce if the NLRB declined to exercise jurisdiction and had not ceded jurisdiction to the state board pursuant to § 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act.
Justices concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan.
Justices dissenting: Burton, Clark.
111. Public Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
A California statute making contingent upon prior approval by its Public Utilities Commission of the Federal Government's practice, sanctioned by federal procurement law, of negotiating special rates with carriers for the transportation of federal property in California is void as conflicting with the federal practices.
Justices concurring: Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Clark, Brennan, Whittaker.
Justices dissenting: Warren, C.J., Burton, Harlan.
112. City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
As applied to a newly organized motor carrier hired by interstate railroads operating in and out of Chicago to transfer interstate passengers and their baggage between different railway terminals in that City, the provision in the Chicago Municipal Code requiring any new transfer service to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity plus approval of the City Council is unconstitutional. Chicago has no power to decide whether the new motor carrier can operate a service which is an integral part of interstate railway transportation subject to regulations under the Federal Interstate Commerce Act.
Justices concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Douglas, Clark, Brennan, Whittaker.
Justices dissenting: Frankfurter, Burton, Harlan.
113. Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
An Ohio antitrust law cannot be invoked to prohibit enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement between a group of interstate motor carriers and local labor unions, which agreement stipulates that truck drivers owning and driving their own vehicles shall be paid the prescribed wages plus at least a prescribed minimum rental for the use of their vehicles. The state antitrust law, insofar as it is applied to prevent contracting parties from enforcing agreement upon a subject matter as to which the National Labor Relations Act directs them to bargain, is invalid.
Justices concurring: Black, Douglas, Clark, Harlan, Brennan. Justice dissenting: Whittaker.
114. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
The failure of the NLRB to assume jurisdiction does not leave California free to apply its laws defining torts and regulating labor relations for purposes of awarding damages to an employer for economic injuries resulting from the picketing of his plant by labor unions not selected by his employees as their bargaining agent. Since the employer is engaged in interstate commerce, California laws cannot be applied to matters falling within the compass of the National Labor Relations Act.
Justices concurring: Harlan, Clark, Whittaker, Stewart (separately).
115. Accord: DeVries v. Baumgartner's Electric Co., 359 U.S. 498 (1959), as to a South Dakota law.
Justices concurring: Frankfurter, Brennan, Warren, C.J., Black, Douglas.
Justices dissenting: Clark, Harlan, Whittaker, Stewart.
116. Accord: Superior Court v. Washington ex rel. Yellow Cab, 361 U.S. 373 (1960), as to a Washington law.
117. Accord: Bogle v. Jakes Foundry Co., 362 U.S. 401 (1960), as to a Tennessee law.
118. Accord: McMahon v. Milam Mfg. Co., 368 U.S. 7 (1961), as to a Mississippi law.
119. Accord: Marine Engineers v. Interlake Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962), as to a Minnesota law.
120. Accord: Waxman v. Virginia, 371 U.S. 4 (1962), as to a Virginia law prohibiting picketing by non-employees.
121. Accord: Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963), involving enjoinder of picketing as violating Georgia right-to-work law.
Justice concurring: Harlan (separately).
122. Accord: Journeymen Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1962), as to a Texas law.
Justices concurring: Harlan, Warren, C.J., Brennan, Black, Stewart, White.
Justices dissenting: Douglas, Clark.
123. Accord: Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963), as to an Ohio law.
Justices concurring: Harlan, Warren, C.J., White, Brennan, Stewart, Black.
Justices dissenting: Douglas, Clark.
124. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
A Virginia statute making it a misdemeanor for any person to remain on the premises of another after having been forbidden to do so could not be enforced against a Negro for refusing to leave the section reserved for white people in a restaurant in a bus terminal by reason of conflict with provision of Interstate Commerce Act forbidding interstate motor vehicle bus carriers from subjecting persons to unjust discrimination.
Justices concurring: Black, Douglas, Warren, C.J., Brennan, Stewart, Frankfurter, Harlan.
Justices dissenting: Whittaker, Clark.
125. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961).
Oregon escheat law could not be applied to support State's claim to property of a resident who died without a will or heirs in a Veterans' Hospital in Oregon; the United States has asserted title thereto under a superseding federal law.
Justices concurring: Black, Warren, C.J., Brennan, Stewart, Frankfurter, Harlan, Clark.
Justices dissenting: Douglas, Whittaker.
126. United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act had been displaced by applicable provisions of the Federal Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, and regulations issued thereunder, and could not be invoked to bar suit by the Veterans' Administration against a veteran to recover the indemnity for a defaulted home loan which it had guaranteed and which had been foreclosed by the lender.
Justices concurring: Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, Warren, C.J., Clark, Whittaker, Frankfurter.
Justices dissenting: Black, Douglas.
127. Federal Land Bank v. Kiowa County, 368 U.S. 146 (1961).
A Kansas statute declaring that oil and gas leases and the royalties derived therefrom were taxable as personal property could not be applied to subject to local taxation an oil and gas lease and income therefrom derived by a Federal Land Bank from property acquired in satisfaction of a debt; under supervening federal law such Land Banks were exempted from all taxes "except taxes on real estate."
Justice concurring specially: Black.
128. United States v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291 (1961).
Michigan law regulating the manner in which a federal tax lien must be recorded was in conflict with applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and therefore was ineffective for purposes of withholding priority to the Government's lien.
Justices concurring: Black, Frankfurter, Brennan, Warren, C.J., Clark, Stewart, Whittaker, Harlan.
Justice dissenting: Douglas.
129. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
Congress having preempted the field by enactment of the Federal Tobacco Inspection Act establishing uniform standards for classification of tobacco, a Georgia law which required Type 14 tobacco grown in Georgia to be identified with a white tag could not be enforced.
Justices concurring: Douglas, Whittaker (separately), Warren, C.J., Brennan, Stewart, Clark.
Justices dissenting: Black, Frankfurter, Harlan.
130. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
Treasury regulations creating a right of survivorship in United States Savings Bonds preempted application of conflicting provisions of Texas Community Property Law which prohibited a married couple from taking advantage of such survivorship regulations whenever the purchase price of said bonds was paid out of community property.
131. State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards, 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
A Texas law imposing a premium tax on insured parties who purchased insurance from insurers not licensed to sell insurance in Texas could not be collected, consistently with the Federal McCarran-Ferguson Act, on insurance contracts purchased in New York from a London insurer by the terms of which premiums thereon and claims thereunder were payable in New York.
Justices concurring: Douglas, Brennan, Warren, C.J., Stewart, Harlan, Clark.
Justice dissenting: Black.
132. Lassiter v. United States, 371 U.S. 10 (1962).
Louisiana laws which segregated passengers in terminal facilities of common carriers were unconstitutional by reason of conflict with federal law and the equal protection clause.
133. United States v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 371 U.S. 228 (1963).
A New York law which provided that payments out of proceeds of a foreclosure of property to discharge state tax liens should be deemed "expenses" of the mortgage foreclosure sale was ineffective to defeat priority accorded by federal law to federal tax liens antedating liens for state and local real property taxes and assessments.
Justices concurring: Warren, C.J., Black, Brennan, Stewart, Goldberg, Harlan, Clark, White.
Justice dissenting: Douglas.
134. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963).
A California statute which authorized the fixing of minimum wholesale and retail prices for milk could not be enforced as to purchases of milk for military consumption or for resale at commissaries at federal military installations in California; conflicting federal statutes and regulations governing procurement with appropriated funds of goods for the Armed Forces required competitive bidding or negotiation reflecting active competition which would be nullified by minimum prices determined by factors not specified in federal law.
Justices concurring: Douglas, Black, Warren, C.J., White, Brennan, Clark.
Justices dissenting: Stewart, Harlan, Goldberg.
135. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Robertson, 372 U.S. 591 (1963).
Suability of an out-of-state national bank in courts of Nebraska is determined by applicable provisions of the federal banking laws and not by recourse to a Nebraska statute defining the venue of local actions involving liability under the Nebraska Installment Loan Act.
Justices concurring: Black (separately), Douglas (separately).
136. Accord: Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963), as to venue in Texas.
Justices concurring: White, Stewart, Brennan, Warren, C.J., Goldberg.
Justices dissenting: Harlan, Douglas, Black.
137. Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
A Florida law regulating admission to the Bar could not be enforced, consistently with the principle of national supremacy, to prevent a person admitted to practice before the United States Patent Office as a Patent Attorney from serving clients in the latter capacity in Florida.
138. Bus Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963).
Missouri's King-Thompson Act, which authorized the governor to seize and operate a public utility when the public welfare was jeopardized by a strike threat, was inconsistent with 29 U.S.C. § 157 of the National Labor Relations Act defining the rights of employees as to collective bargaining and, consistently with national supremacy, could not be enforced.
139. Corbett v. Stergios, 381 U.S. 124 (1965).
Iowa's reciprocal inheritance law conditioning the right of non-resident aliens to take Iowa real property by intestate succession upon existence of a reciprocal right of United States citizens to take real property upon same terms and conditions in alien's country could not under United States-Greece treaty and supremacy clause bar Greek national from inheriting property.
140. Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
Florida unemployment compensation law disqualifying for benefits any person unemployed as a result of a labor dispute when applied to disqualify a person who has filed an unfair labor practice charge against her employer because of her discharge conflicts with federal labor law and is void under supremacy clause.
141. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
A New York statute changing levels of benefits and deleting items to be included in levels of benefit which reduced moneys to recipients conflicted with federal law which required States to adjust upward in terms of increases costs of living amounts deemed necessary for subsistence.
Justices concurring: Harlan, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall.
Justices dissenting: Black, Burger, C.J..
142. Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
A California statute reducing the amount of dependent children funds going to any household by the amount of funds imputed to presence of a "man-in-the-house" who was not legally obligated to support the child or children conflicts with federal law as interpreted by valid HEW regulations.
Justices concurring: Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall.
Justices dissenting: Burger, C.J., Black.
143. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971).
A California statute providing for suspension of unemployment compensation if the former employer appeals an eligibility decision of a departmental examiner, the suspension to last until decision of the appeal, conflicts with the federal act's requirement that compensation must be paid when due.
144. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
An Arizona statute providing that a discharge in bankruptcy shall not operate to relieve a judgment creditor under the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of any obligation under the Act conflicts with the provision of the federal bankruptcy law which discharges a debtor of all but specified judgments.
145. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
An Illinois statute and implementing regulations which made needy dependent children 18 through 20 years old eligible for welfare benefits if they were attending high school or vocational training school but not if they were attending college or university conflicts with federal social security law.
146. Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Org., 409 U.S. 809 (1972).
A district court decision holding invalid as in conflict with the federal Social Security Act an Indiana statute denying benefits to persons aged 16 to 18 who are eligible but for the fact that they are not regularly attending school is summarily affirmed.
147. Philpott v. Welfare Board, 409 U.S. 413 (1973).
A New Jersey statute providing for recovery by the State of reimbursement for financial assistance when the recipient subsequently obtains funds cannot be applied to obtain reimbursement out of federal disability insurance benefits inasmuch as federal law bars subjecting such funds to any legal process.
148. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
A Burbank, California ordinance placing an 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. curfew on jet take-offs from its local airport is invalid as in conflict with the regulatory scheme of federal statutory control.
Justices concurring: Douglas, Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Rehnquist, Stewart, White, Marshall.
149. Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973).
A Washington State statute construed to prohibit net fishing by members of the Tribe conflicts with the Tribe's treaty rights and is invalid.
150. Beasley v. Food Fair, 416 U.S. 653 (1974).
North Carolina's right-to-work law giving employees discharged by reason of union membership a cause of action against their employer cannot be applied to supervisors in view of 29 U.S.C. § 164(a), which provides that no law should compel an employer to treat a supervisor as an employee.
151. Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
Virginia statute creating cause of action for "insulting words" as construed to permit recovery for use in labor dispute of words "scab" and similar words is preempted by federal labor law.
Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, Stewart, White, Blackmun. Justice concurring specially: Douglas.
Justices dissenting: Powell, Rehnquist, Burger, C.J..
152. Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
Montana laws imposing personal property taxes, vendor license fees, and a cigarette sales tax may not constitutionally be applied to reservation Indians under supremacy clause because federal statutory law precludes such application.
153. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
A New Mexico law providing for the roundup and sale by a state agency of "estrays" cannot under the supremacy clause be constitutionally applied to unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros on public lands of the United States that are protected by federal law.
154. Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. WERC, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
A Wisconsin statute proscribing concerted efforts by employees to interfere with production, except through actual strikes, cannot under the supremacy clause be constitutionally applied to union members' concerted refusal to work overtime during negotiations for renewal of an expired contract since such conduct was intended by Congress to be regulable by neither the States nor the NLRB.
Justices concurring: Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Power, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist.
155. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
California's statutory imposition of weight requirements in packaging for sale of bacon and flour which did not allow for loss of weight resulting from moisture loss during distribution while the applicable federal law does is invalid (1) as to bacon because of express federal law and (2) as to flour because adherence to state law would defeat a purpose of the federal law.
Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Rehnquist, Stewart as to flour.
156. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
A Virginia statute prohibiting nonresidents from fishing within certain state waters is preempted by federal enrollment and licensing laws that grant an affirmative right to fish in coastal waters.
157. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
Alabama statutory height and weight requirements for prison guards have an impermissible discriminatory effect upon women, and under the supremacy clause must yield to the federal fair employment law.
Justices concurring: Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, Burger, C.J.. Justice dissenting: White.
158. Maher v. Buckner, 434 U.S. 898 (1977).
A Connecticut statutory rule rendering ineligible for welfare benefits individuals who have transferred assets within seven years of applying for benefits unless they can prove the transfer was made for "reasonable consideration" is inconsistent with the Social Security Act and therefore void.
159. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
Certain provisions of a Washington statute imposing design or safety standards on oil tankers using state waters and banning operation in those waters of tankers exceeding certain weights, as well as certain pilotage requirements, are invalid as conflicting with federal law.
Justices concurring: Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, Rehnquist, C.J.. Justices concurring specially: O'Connor, Thomas.
Justice dissenting: Stevens.
160. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
California community property statute, under which property acquired during the marriage by either spouse belongs to both, may not be applied to award a divorced spouse an interest in the other spouse's pension benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act, because the Act precludes subjecting benefits to any legal process to deprive recipients.
Justices concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Stewart, Rehnquist.
161. Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979).
An Illinois law differentiating between children who reside in foster homes with relatives and those who do not reside with relatives and giving the latter greater benefits than the former conflicts with federal law, which requires the same benefits be provided regardless of whether the foster home is operated by a relative.
162. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
Arizona's imposition of tax upon electricity produced in State and sold outside the State, which is not offset against other taxes as is the case with electricity sold within State, violates federal statute prohibiting any State from taxing the generation or transmission of electricity in a manner that discriminates against out-of-state consumers, and thus is unenforceable.
163. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
A California statute requiring all wine producers and wholesalers to file fair trade contracts or price schedules with the State and to follow the price lists is a resale price maintenance scheme that violates the Sherman Act.
164. Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
Ventura County, California zoning ordinances governing oil exploration and extraction activities cannot be applied to a company which holds a lease from the United States Government because federal law preempts the field.
165. Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
Imposition of a Washington state motor vehicle excise tax and mobile home, camper, and trailer taxes on vehicles owned by the Tribe or its members and used both on and off the reservation violates federal law and cannot stand under the supremacy clause.
Justices concurring: White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Stewart, Rehnquist.
166. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
Imposition of Arizona's motor carrier license tax and use fuel tax on a non-Indian enterprise authorized to do business in Arizona but operating entirely on reservation conflicts with federal law and cannot stand under the supremacy clause.
Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist.
167. Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
Arizona's imposition of tax upon on-reservation sale of farm machinery to Indian tribe by non-Indian, off-reservation enterprise conflicts with federal law and is invalid under the supremacy clause.
Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens.
168. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981).
An Iowa statute subjecting to damages a common carrier who abandons service and thereby injures shippers is preempted by the Interstate Commerce Act, which empowers the ICC to approve cessation of service on branch lines upon carrier petitions.
169. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
A New Jersey workmen's compensation provision denying employers the right to reduce retiree's pension benefits by the amount of a compensation award under the act is preempted by federal pension regulation law.
170. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
Louisiana's "first-use tax" statute which, because of exceptions and credits, imposes a tax only on natural gas moving out-of-state, impermissibly discriminates against interstate commerce, and another provision that required pipeline companies to allocate cost of the tax to the ultimate consumer is preempted by federal law.
171. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
California community property statute, to the extent it treated retired pay of Army officers as property divisible between spouses on divorce, is preempted by federal law.
Justices concurring: Blackmun, White, Marshall, Powell, Stevens, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Rehnquist, Brennan, Stewart.
172. Agsalud v. Standard Oil Co., 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
A court of appeals decision holding preempted by federal pension law Hawaii law requiring employers to provide their employees with a comprehensive prepaid health care plan is summarily affirmed.
173. Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982).
A provision of New York's emergency assistance program precluding assistance to persons receiving AFDC to replace a lost or stolen AFDC grant is contrary to valid federal regulations proscribing inequitable treatment under the emergency assistance program.
174. Fidelity Fed. S. & L. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
California's prohibition on unreasonable restraints on alienation, construed to prohibit "due-on-sale" clauses in mortgage contracts, is preempted by Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations permitting federal savings and loan associations to include such clauses in their contracts.
Justices concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall, O'Connor, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Rehnquist, Stevens.
175. Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
A New Mexico tax imposed on the gross receipts that a non-Indian construction company received from a tribal school board for construction of a school for Indian children on reservation is preempted by federal law.
Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, O'Connor, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Rehnquist, White, Stevens.
176. Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392 (1983).
A Tennessee tax on the net earnings of banks, applied to interest earned on obligations of the United States, is void as conflicting with 31 U.S.C. § 3124.
177. Busbee v. Georgia, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983).
A federal district court decision that Georgia's congressional redistricting plan is invalid as having a racially discriminatory purpose in conflict with the Voting Rights Act is summarily affirmed.
178. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n v. CONRAIL, 461 U.S. 912 (1983).
A federal district court decision holding that federal statutes (the Federal Railroad Safety Act and the locomotive boiler inspection laws) preempt a Pennsylvania law requiring locomotives to maintain speed records and indicators, summarily affirmed by an appeals court, is summarily affirmed.
179. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
Prohibition on pass-through to consumers of an increase in Alabama's oil and gas severance tax is invalid as conflicting with the Natural Gas Act to the extent that it applies to sales of gas in interstate commerce.
180. Philco Aviation v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406 (1983).
An Illinois statute recognizing the validity of an unrecorded, oral sale of an aircraft is preempted by the Federal Aviation Act's provision that unrecorded "instruments" of transfer are invalid.
181. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
The New York Human Rights Law is preempted by ERISA to the extent that it prohibits practices that are lawful under the federal law.
182. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855 (1983).
A Texas property tax on bank shares, computed on the basis of a bank's net assets without any deduction for the value of United States obligations held by the bank, is invalid as conflicting with Rev. Stat. § 3701 (31 U.S.C. § 3124).
Justices concurring: Blackmun, Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Rehnquist, Stevens.
183. Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Engineering, 463 U.S. 1220 (1983).
An appeals court holding that a Connecticut statute requiring employers to provide health and life insurance to former employees is preempted by ERISA as related to an employee benefit plan, is summarily affirmed.
184. Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7 (1983).
A Hawaii "property tax" on the gross income of airlines operating within the State is preempted by a federal prohibition on state taxes on carriage of air passengers "or on the gross receipts derived there-from."
185. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
California's franchise law, requiring judicial resolution of certain claims, is preempted by the United States Arbitration Act, which precludes judicial resolution in state or federal courts of claims that contracting parties agree to submit to arbitration.
Justices concurring: Burger, C.J., Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell. Justice concurring in part and dissenting in part: Stevens.
Justices dissenting: O'Connor, Rehnquist.
186. Texas v. KVUE-TV, 465 U.S. 1092 (1984).
An appeals court holding that a Texas statute regulating the broadcast of political advertisements is preempted by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to the extent that it imposes sponsorship identification requirements on advertising for candidates for federal office, and to the extent that it conflicts with federal regulation of political advertising rates, is summarily affirmed.
187. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984).
A Michigan statute making agricultural producers' associations the exclusive bargaining agents and requiring payment of service fees by non-member producers is preempted as conflicting with federal policy of the Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967, protecting the right of farmers to join or not join such associations.
188. Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
The Oklahoma Constitution's general ban on advertising of alcoholic beverages, as applied to out-of-state cable television signals carried by in-state operators, is preempted by federal regulations implementing the Communications Act.
189. Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256 (1985).
A South Dakota statute requiring local governments to distribute federal payments in lieu of taxes in the same manner that they distribute general tax revenues conflicts with the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act, which provides that the recipient local government may use the payment for any governmental purpose.
Justices concurring: White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, O'Connor, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Rehnquist, Stevens.
190. Gerace v. Grocery Mfrs. of America, 474 U.S. 801 (1985).
An appeals court decision holding that federal laws (the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; the Meat Inspection Act; and the Poultry Products Act) preempt a New York requirement that cheese alternatives be labeled "imitation" is summarily affirmed.
191. Wisconsin Dep't of Industry v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
A Wisconsin statute debarring from doing business with the state persons or firms guilty of repeat violations of the National Labor Relations Act is preempted by that Act.
192. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986).
A New Jersey statute creating an oil spill compensation fund is preempted by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act to the extent that the state fund is used to finance cleanup activities at sites listed in the National Contingency Plan.
Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Burger, C.J..
Justice dissenting: Stevens.
193. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877 (1986).
A North Dakota statute disclaiming jurisdiction over actions brought by tribal Indians suing non-Indians in state courts over claims arising in Indian country is preempted by federal Indian law (Pub. L. 280).
Justices concurring: O'Connor, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Rehnquist, Brennan, Stevens.
194. Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986).
Louisiana's wrongful death statute is preempted by the Death on the High Seas Act as applied to a helicopter crash 35 miles off shore.
Justices concurring: O'Connor, White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, Burger, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Powell, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens.
195. Roberts v. Burlington Industries, 477 U.S. 901 (1986).
An appeals court holding that New York severance pay requirements were preempted by ERISA is summarily affirmed.
196. Brooks v. Burlington Industries, 477 U.S. 901 (1986).
An appeals court holding that North Carolina severance pay requirements were preempted by ERISA is summarily affirmed.
197. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
North Carolina's legislative redistricting plan, creating multi-member districts having the effect of impairing the opportunity of black voters to participate in the political process, is invalid under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Justices concurring: Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens.
Justices concurring specially: O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, Burger.
Justices concurring in part and dissenting in part: Stevens, Marshall, Black-mun.
198. Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S. 1 (1986).
A provision of Arkansas' workers' compensation act requiring that death benefits be reduced by the amount of any federal benefits paid is preempted by a federal requirement that federal benefits be "in addition to any other benefit due"; a contrary ruling by an Arizona appeals court is summarily reversed.
199. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335 (1987).
A section of New York's alcoholic beverage control law establishing retail price maintenance violates section 1 of the Sherman Act, and is not saved by the Twenty First Amendment.
Justices concurring: Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia.
Justices dissenting: O'Connor, Rehnquist, C.J..
200. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
A California statute governing the operation of bingo games is preempted as applied to Indian tribes conducting on-reservation games.
Justices concurring: White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia.
201. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
A Riverside County, California ordinance regulating the operation of bingo and various card games is preempted as applied to Indian tribes conducting on-reservation games.
Justices concurring: White, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia.
202. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
The Federal Arbitration Act preempts a section of California Labor Code providing that actions for collection of wages may be maintained "without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate."
Justices concurring: Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Scalia, Rehnquist, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Stevens, O'Connor.
203. Montana v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 484 U.S. 997 (1988).
A federal appeals court decision that Montana's coal severance and gross proceeds taxes, as applied to Indian-owned coal produced by non-Indians, are preempted by federal Indian policies underlying the Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, is summarily affirmed.
204. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988).
A Michigan statute requiring approval of the Michigan Public Service Commission before a natural gas company may issue long-term securities is preempted as applied to companies subject to FERC regulation under the Natural Gas Act.
205. Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S. 395 (1988).
An Arkansas statute authorizing seizure of prisoners' property in order to defray costs of incarceration is invalid as applied to Social Security benefits, exempted from legal process by 42 U.S.C. § 407(a).
206. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
A Georgia statute barring garnishment of funds or benefits of employee benefit plans subject to ERISA is preempted by ERISA § 514(a) as a state law that "relates to" covered plans.
Justices concurring: White, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, Rehnquist, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Kennedy, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia.
207. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
Wisconsin's notice-of-claim statute, requiring that persons suing state or local governments or officials in state court must give notice and then refrain from filing suit for an additional period, is preempted as applied to civil rights actions brought in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Justices concurring: Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy.
Justices dissenting: O'Connor, Rehnquist, C.J..
208. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
Virginia tort law governing product design defects is preempted by federal common law as applied to suits against government contractors for damages resulting from design defects in military equipment if the equipment conformed to reasonably precise specifications and if the contractor warned the government of known dangers.
Justices concurring: Scalia, White, O'Connor, Kennedy, Rehnquist, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens.
209. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
A Florida statute prohibiting the use of the direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls, and creating a cause of action in favor of the original manufacturer, is preempted by federal patent law as conflicting with the balance Congress has struck between patent protection and free trade in industrial design.
210. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989).
Michigan's income tax law, by providing exemption for retirement benefits of state employees but not for retirement benefits of Federal employees, discriminates against federal employees in violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111 and in violation of the constitutional doctrine of inter-governmental tax immunity.
Justices concurring: Kennedy, Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Rehnquist, C.J..
Justice dissenting: Stevens.
211. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
A provision of Pennsylvania's motor vehicle financial responsibility law prohibiting subrogation and reimbursement from a claimant's tort recovery for benefits received from a self-insured health care plan is preempted by ERISA as "relat[ing] to [an] employee benefit plan."
Justices concurring: O'Connor, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Scalia, Kennedy, Rehnquist, C.J..
Justice dissenting: Stevens.
212. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
A Texas common law claim that an employee was wrongfully discharged to prevent his attainment of benefits under a plan covered by ERISA is preempted as a "State law" that "relates to" a covered benefit plan. The state cause of action also "conflicts directly" with an exclusive ERISA cause of action.
213. County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
The County of Yakima, Washington's excise tax on sales of allotted Indian land does not constitute permissible "taxation of land" within the meaning of § 6 of the General Allotment Act, and is invalid.
214. Barker v. Kansas, 503 U.S. 594 (1992).
A Kansas tax on military retirement benefits is inconsistent with 4 U.S.C. § 111, which allows states to tax federal employees' compensation if the tax does not discriminate "because of the source" of the compensation. No similar tax is applied to state and local government retirees, and there are no significant differences between the two classes of taxpayers that justify the different tax treatment.
215. Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
Illinois' "dual impact" laws designed to protect both employees and the general public by requiring training and licensing of hazardous waste equipment operators are preempted by § 18(b) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 667(b), which requires states to obtain federal approval before enforcing occupational safety and health standards relating to issues governed by federal standards.
216. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
Two claims, based on New Jersey law and brought against cigarette companies for damages for lung cancer allegedly resulting from smoking, are preempted under the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act: failure-to-warn claims requiring a showing that the tobacco companies' post-1969 advertising should have included additional warnings, and fraudulent misrepresentation claims predicated on state law restrictions on advertising.
217. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993).
Oklahoma may not impose income taxes or motor vehicle taxes on members of the Sac and Fox Nation who live in "Indian country," whether the land is within reservation boundaries, on allotted lands, or in dependent communities. Such tax jurisdiction is considered to be preempted unless Congress has expressly provided to the contrary.
218. Department of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993).
An Ohio statute setting priority of claims against insolvent insurance companies is preempted by the federal priority statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3713, which accords first priority to the United States, to the extent that the Ohio law protects the claims of creditors who are not policyholders. Insofar as it protects the claims of policyholders, the law is saved from preemption by section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Justices concurring: Blackmun, White, Stevens, O'Connor, Rehnquist, C.J..
Justices dissenting: Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, Thomas.
219. American Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 213 (1995).
The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, to the extent that it authorizes actions in state court challenging as "unfair or deceptive" marketing practices an airline company's changes in its frequent flyer program, is preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, which prohibits states from "enact[ing] or enforc[ing] any law . . . relating to [air carrier] rates, routes, or services."
Justices concurring: Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, Rehnquist, C.J.. Justices concurring specially: O'Connor, Thomas.
Justice dissenting: Stevens.
220. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
Oklahoma may not impose its motor fuels excise tax upon fuel sold by Chickasaw Nation retail stores on tribal trust land. The legal incidence of the motor fuels tax falls on the retailer, located within Indian country, and the petitioner did not properly raise the issue of whether Congress had authorized such taxation in the Hayden-Cart-wright Act.
221. Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
A federal law empowering national banks in small towns to sell insurance (12 U.S.C. § 92) preempts a Florida law prohibiting banks from dealing in insurance. The federal law contains no explicit statement of preemption, but preemption is implicit because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of one of the federal law's purposes.
222. Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
A Montana law declaring an arbitration clause unenforceable unless notice that the contract is subject to arbitration appears in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.
Concurring Justices: Ginsburg, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, Rehnquist, C.J.. Justice dissenting: Thomas.
223. Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997).
A Louisiana statute that provides for an "open primary" in October for election of Members of Congress and that provides that any candidate receiving a majority of the vote in that primary "is elected," conflicts with the federal law, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 7, that provides for a uniform federal election day in November, and is void to the extent of conflict. "[A] contested selection of candidates for a congressional office that is concluded as a matter of law before the federal election day . . . clearly violates § 7."
224. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
Four Washington State regulations governing oil tanker operations and manning are preempted. Primarily through Title II of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, Congress has occupied the field of regulation of general seaworthiness of tankers and their crews, and there is no room for these state regulations imposing training and English language proficiency requirements on crews and imposing staffing requirements for navigation watch. State reporting requirements applicable to certain marine incidents are also preempted.
225. Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003).
Alabama’s usury statute is preempted by sections 85 and 86 of the National Bank Act as applied to interest rates charged by national banks.
Justices concurring: Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Rehnquist, C.J.
Justices dissenting: Scalia and Thomas.
226. American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act, which requires any insurance company doing business in the state to disclose information about policies it or “related” companies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945, is preempted as interfering with the Federal Government’s conduct of foreign relations.
Justices concurring: Souter, O’Connor, Kennedy, Breyer, and Rehnquist, C.J.
Justices dissenting: Ginsburg, Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas.
227. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
Suits brought in state court alleging that HMOs violated their duty under the Texas Health Care Liability Act “to exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions” are preempted by ERISA § 502(a), which authorizes suit “to recover benefits due [a participant] under the terms of his plan.”
228. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
California law allowing use of marijuana for medical purposes is preempted by the Controlled Substances Act’s categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of marijuana.
Justices concurring: Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer.
Justices dissenting: O’Connor, Thomas, Rehnquist, C.J.
229. Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
Arkansas statute that imposes lien on tort settlements in an amount equal to Medicaid costs, even when Medicaid costs exceed the portion of the settlement that represents medical costs, is preempted by the Federal Medicaid law insofar as the Arkansas statute applies to amounts other than medical costs.
230. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
Part III of the opinion found a Texas redistricting statute to violate the federal Voting Rights Act because it diluted the voting power of Latinos.
Justices concurring in Part III: Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer.
Justice dissenting from Part III: Roberts, C.J., Alito, Scalia, Thomas.
231. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
A national bank’s state-chartered subsidiary real estate lending business is subject to federal, not state, law.
Justices concurring: Ginsburg, Alito, Breyer, Kennedy, Souter.
Justices dissenting: Stevens, Roberts, C.J., Scalia.
232. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act bars common- law claims challenging the safety and effectiveness of medical devices that have been given premarket approval by the FDA.
Justices concurring: Scalia, Roberts, C.J., Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Stevens.
Justice dissenting: Ginsburg.
233. Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transportation Association, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008).
The federal Motor Carrier Act of 1980, which prohibits states from enacting any law related to a motor carrier price, route, or service, preempts two provisions of a Maine statute that regulate the delivery of tobacco to customers within the state.
234. Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009).
New York statute that gave the state’s supreme courts — its trial courts of general jurisdiction — jurisdiction over suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, except in the case of suits seeking money damages from corrections officers, was preempted because it was “contrary to Congress’ judgment that all persons who violate federal rights while acting under color of state law shall be held liable for damages.”
Justices concurring: Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer.
Justices dissenting: Thomas, Roberts, C.J., Scalia, Alito.
Last modified: June 9, 2014