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We begin our analysis with the well established rule of
statutory construction that statutes are to be read so as to give
effect to their plain and ordinary meaning unless to do so would
produce absurd or futile results. United States v. American
Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534, 543-544 (1940); see Tamarisk
Country Club v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 756, 761 (1985). Moreover,
where a statute is clear on its face, we require unequivocal
evidence of legislative purpose before construing the statute so
as to override the plain meaning of the words used therein.
Halpern v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 895, 899 (1991); Huntsberry v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 742, 747-748 (1984).
Although there is a dearth of case law construing section
512(a)(3)(D), we nonetheless find one of our prior cases, Atlanta
Athletic Club v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-83, revd. 980 F.2d
1409 (11th Cir. 1993), to be instructive. In Atlanta Athletic
Club v. Commissioner, supra, the taxpayer (an organization
described in section 501(c)(7) and exempt from income taxation
under section 501(a)) operated a country club including two 18-
hole golf courses, a clubhouse, a swimming pool, tennis courts,
and other recreational facilities for the benefit of its members
and their guests. During its taxable year ended March 31, 1985,
the taxpayer realized gain of approximately $2.3 million on the
sale of 108 acres of land. The taxpayer subsequently reinvested
the $2.3 million in additional recreational facilities within 3
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