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memorandum is justified because of petitioner's inability to
obtain other evidence showing how common "back-to-back
loanstructures" were when Rev. Rul. 87-89, supra, was issued and
because petitioner cited that memorandum in his trial memorandum
and advised respondent approximately one month prior to the trial
of these cases that he would ask the Court to take judicial
notice of that memorandum. Even assuming arguendo that peti-
tioner were to satisfy the third and fifth conditions (set forth
above) that are imposed by rule 803(24) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence and to which petitioner's contentions are addressed, he
has not attempted to establish that the other conditions for
admissibility of the August 1987 memorandum that are imposed by
rule 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence are satisfied.
For example, petitioner has not attempted to establish that
the August 1987 memorandum possesses circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness equivalent to other classes of hearsay governed
by rule 803 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, such as those of
rule 803(8), on which petitioner also relies. Nor has petitioner
attempted to show the knowledge and qualifications of the declar-
ant (i.e., the author of the August 1987 memorandum), factors to
be considered in evaluating the trustworthiness of a statement.
See Herdman v. Smith, 707 F.2d 839, 841 (5th Cir. 1983). On the
instant record, we do not consider the August 1987 memorandum
admissible under rule 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
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