- 37 -
used to recover costs associated with the bond issue. In the
instant case, that is exactly what happened. When all the smoke
had cleared, the underwriters, bankers, and attorneys had
received substantial amounts from the Bonds' proceeds, and the
repayment of those Bonds had been secured by the purchase of the
GIC's. The relatively small amount left was insufficient to
accomplish the governmental purpose of the bonds.
Petitioners next argue that section 148(f) should not apply
when the governmental issuer of the bonds did not intend that the
bond proceeds be invested in higher yielding, nonpurpose
obligations. However, the literal provisions of section
148(f)(1) and (2) make no reference to the issuer's intent.
Rather, the language of section 148(f)(2) is computational in
nature and unambiguous.18
18There is no need to resort to legislative history, unless
the statutory language is ambiguous. In Hubbard v. United
States, 514 U.S. , , , 115 S. Ct. 1754, 1759, 1761
(1995), the Supreme Court recently stated:
In the ordinary case, absent any "indication that doing
so would frustrate Congress's clear intention or yield
patent absurdity, our obligation is to apply the
statute as Congress wrote it." BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 511 U.S. (1994) (SOUTER, J., dissenting).
* * * * * * *
Courts should not rely on inconclusive statutory
history as a basis for refusing to give effect to the
plain language of an Act of Congress, particularly when
the Legislature has specifically defined the
controverted term. * * *
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