- 4 - Subsequent to the remand of the instant case, both parties filed separate motions. Petitioners' motion seeks summary judgment. Petitioners contend that we may not properly consider the issue of quasi-estoppel because quasi-estoppel is an 1(...continued) F.2d 622, 623 (5th Cir. 1972); Crosley Corp. v. United States, 229 F.2d 376, 380 (6th Cir. 1956); Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483, 496 (1st Cir. 1948)(simple failure to report income “is not a representation that such income has in fact not been received” and does not, without more, furnish grounds for estoppel); Mertens, supra, sec. 60.05 ("Where there is a mistake of law and no factual misrepresentations, the doctrine of consistency does not apply."). Moreover, the misstatement must be one on which the government reasonably relied, in the sense that it neither knew, nor ought to have known, the true nature of the transaction mischaracterized by the taxpayer. See Herrington, 854 F.2d at 758; Mayfair Minerals, 456 F.2d at 623; Ross, 169 F.2d at 495-96. In this case, it seems possible that * * * [petitioner] made representations of key facts regarding the genuine business activities of * * * [the foreign controlled corporation] throughout the 1970's and the genuine intent on his and * * * [his partner’s] part to repay the * * * [foreign controlled corporation] “loans.” If such representations of fact were made, then holding * * * [petitioner] to them now might generate a 1984 tax liability. We stress, however, that we are uncertain about this matter. Since it has not been argued here, and since factual history is at issue, both the Lewises and the Commissioner should have a full opportunity to argue the issue before the Tax Court. We therefore vacate the Tax Court's judgment insofar as it is inconsistent with this opinion. And, we remand the case to the Tax Court for further proceedings. [Lewis v. Commissioner, 18 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1994), vacating in part and remanding T.C. Memo. 1992-391.]Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Next
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