Bruce Selig and Elaine Selig - Page 13

                                       - 13 -                                         
          that there is no limit on the useful life of a restored car or              
          other vehicle as a museum object."  Id., 661 F.2d at 207.  In               
          Simon v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. at 264, we acknowledged that, to            
          qualify as recovery property, in the case of a passive business             
          asset that suffered no wear and tear, a taxpayer would have to              
          prove a determinable useful life.  An example of a passive                  
          business asset that normally would suffer no wear and tear is a             
          painting displayed for business purposes.  E.g., Clinger v.                 
          Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-459 (painting purchased by a                  
          professional artist and displayed in part for marketing reasons             
          not recovery property for failure to prove determinable useful              
          life).  Once a taxpayer establishes that an asset is subject to             
          exhaustion, wear and tear, or obsolescence, however, we need not            
          concern ourselves with the particular useful life of the asset.             
          Liddle v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. at 296-297; Simon v.                       
          Commissioner, supra.  It is of course possible that the exotic              
          automobiles might some day become museum pieces.  Respondent                
          suggests that they were museum pieces, but she offers no evidence           
          to support that claim.  We are satisfied that the exotic                    
          automobiles were show cars, which, because of obsolescence, had a           
          limited useful life, not museum pieces with an indeterminable               
          useful life.  The facts of the Harrah's Club case are                       
          distinguishable.                                                            
               At the conclusion of the trial in this case, respondent                
          stated that she no longer would rely on section 183 as a basis              




Page:  Previous  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  Next

Last modified: May 25, 2011