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assumptions helps us to evaluate his conclusions. We agree with
his assumptions and believe he used the proper analysis to value
decedent’s CSB stock.
Petitioner points out that Spiro did not include CSB’s work
in process on contingent fee cases as a CSB asset in valuing
decedent's CSB stock and contends that Spiro incorrectly assumed
that the shareholders, not CSB, owned the work in process. We
disagree for the reasons stated above in paragraphs C and D.
Petitioner contends that Spiro mistakenly failed to consider
client costs advanced by CSB in contingent fee cases as a CSB
asset. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929);
Estate of Van Horne v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 735 (1982), affd.
720 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1983); Estate of Curry v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 540, 546-547 (1980) (contingent legal fees, by virtue of
their contingency, are not automatically excluded from the gross
estate; rather, the contingent nature of the contract bears on
the factual question of valuation). We disagree. Spiro’s
exclusion of advanced client costs was proper because he
estimated the value of decedent’s CSB stock under the stock
redemption provisions of the 1973 agreement and the 1988
amendment.
Finally, petitioner contends that Spiro erred in concluding
that the shareholders’ agreement was followed in the past when
shareholders withdrew from CSB, and points out that Mr. Borowsky
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