- 8 -
this testimony to be credible. Much of their testimony is vague,
uncorroborated, and/or inconsistent. Under the circumstances, we
are not required to, and we do not, rely on that testimony to
support petitioners' positions herein. See Ruark v.
Commissioner, 449 F.2d 311, 312 (9th Cir. 1971), affg. per curiam
T.C. Memo. 1969-48; Clark v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 698, 708-709
(9th Cir. 1959), affg. in part and remanding T.C. Memo. 1957-129;
Tokarski v. Commissioner, supra at 77.
Petitioners have not persuaded us that the disputed deposits
in their personal accounts were loans rather than taxable income.
Thus, we sustain respondent's determinations as reflected in her
notices of deficiency and as adjusted by her concession. With
respect to the $10,000 deposit that was not included in the
notice of deficiency, however, we hold for petitioners.
Respondent must prove that this deposit is income. See, e.g.,
Price v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-187; Collins v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-409. She has failed to do so.
Respondent also determined that the deposits in the Liu
accounts were includable in petitioners' gross income.
Petitioners argue that the Liu accounts were not owned by them,
and that they did not receive any of the underlying funds in 1990
or 1991. Respondent argues that petitioners failed to prove that
they did not have an interest in the Liu accounts during the
subject years.
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