- 4 -
by virtue of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. It argues that the
definition of investment-type property as defined in the 1986
Code applies only to "advance refund" bonds and that the 1994
BANS and the bonds at issue herein are not such bonds.
Particularly in the absence of any legislative history,1 we
are unwilling to conclude that the definition of investment-type
property set forth in the transitional section 1314(h) of TAMRA
1988 should apply to an advance refund but not to a prepayment.
Both types of financing accomplish the same objective, namely to
obtain a financial advantage from the interim use of borrowed
funds in the case of an advance refunding in one case or from a
discount by payment in advance of the due date in the other. We
are reinforced in this view by section 1.148-1(b), Income Tax
Regs., dealing with prepayments, see City of Columbus v.
Commissioner, 106 T.C. at 331-332, and the absence of any
reference therein to any transitional exception. See also sec.
1.148-11, Income Tax Regs.; sec. 1.148-11T, Temporary Income Tax
Regs., 59 Fed. Reg. 24046 (May 10, 1994). This regulation, with
its specific recognition of realistically defined exceptions to
its application, is consistent with the clearly expressed
concerns of Congress in 1986, discussed in our prior opinion,
City of Columbus v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. at 331, and again in
1 Neither petitioner nor our own research has revealed any such
history.
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011