Roger G. Cotner and Marlan W. Cotner - Page 9

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          dressage riding was on a personal, recreational basis.  We think            
          it more likely than not that petitioner's decision to breed Sassy           
          was for the primary purpose of perpetuating what she believed to            
          be an excellent bloodline, and that any profit motive was merely            
          incidental to her primary purpose.                                          
               In light of the foregoing, we find that petitioner's                   
          motivation behind producing the foal was primarily personal in              
          nature and that any profit motive that existed was merely                   
          incidental.  The transaction in which Daisy was sold was nothing            
          more than the sale of petitioner's personal, albeit capital,3               
          asset.  The loss from the transaction is not within the                     
          categories of losses allowed by section 165, or any other                   
          provision of the Internal Revenue Code.  Accordingly, petitioners           
          are not entitled to a long-term capital loss deduction for the              
          year 1990 in connection with the sale of Daisy.                             
               In view of the foregoing, we need not address respondent's             
          other arguments related to this issue.                                      
           Accuracy-Related Penalty                                                   
               Respondent determined that petitioners are liable for the              
          accuracy-related penalty imposed by section 6662(a).  Section               
          6662(a) and (b)(1) imposes a penalty on any portion of an                   
          underpayment which is attributable to negligence or disregard of            

          3Respondent, in her brief, suggests that Daisy was not a                    
          capital asset in the hands of petitioner.  No authority for this            
          proposition was stated and it would appear to us that, given the            
          express language of sec. 1221, which provides the definition of a           
          capital asset, Daisy clearly fits within that definition.                   



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