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do not apply to a “waiver of a right to payment of benefits made
by a designated beneficiary.” We disagree.
“As a general rule, rights under an ERISA plan may not be
waived or assigned”. Ferris v. Marriott Family Restaurants,
Inc., 878 F. Supp. 273, 277 (D. Mass. 1994) (emphasis added).
The waiver here effectively changed the beneficiary of the Plan.
Such a waiver of benefits is equivalent to an assignment or
alienation, which is statutorily prohibited in the qualified
pension plan at issue.
Petitioner argues that ERISA section 206(d)(1) and I.R.C.
section 401(a)(13) simply require that plans contain some type of
antialienation provision. Such provisions, however, must be
given effect. By violating the statutory provisions, the Plan
ceases to be qualified. “To be qualified, both a plan’s terms
and operations must meet the statutory requirements.” Fazi v.
Commissioner, 102 T.C. 695, 702 (1994); see Ludden v.
Commissioner, 620 F.2d 700, 702 (9th Cir. 1980), affg. 68 T.C.
826 (1977); see also Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Natl. Pension
Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 371 (1990) (ERISA section 206(d)(1) prohibits
the assignment or alienation of pension plan benefits). GCI’s
amendment to the Plan providing for the waiver, if given effect,
violates the antialienation requirements of ERISA section
206(d)(1) and I.R.C. section 401(a)(13).
Petitioner also argues that waivers are permissible if
“knowingly and voluntarily” made; however, petitioner fails to
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