- 88 -- 88 -
solely upon Miller's interest in the recyclers for the taxable
years at issue, was not applicable because Miller made payments
prior to December 31, 1984, so no interest accrued after that
time. Respondent did not notify petitioners or any other
taxpayers of the disposition of the Miller cases. Estate of
Satin v. Commissioner, supra; Fisher v. Commissioner,
supra.
Petitioners argue that they are similarly situated to the
taxpayer in the Miller cases, and that in accordance with the
principle of "equality" they are therefore entitled to the same
settlement agreement executed by respondent and Miller in those
cases. In effect, petitioners seek to resurrect the piggyback
agreement offer and/or the settlement offer they previously
failed to accept.
Petitioners contend that under the principle of equality,
the Commissioner has a duty of consistency toward similarly
situated taxpayers and cannot tax one and not tax another without
some rational basis for the difference. United States v. Kaiser,
363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see Baker
v. United States, 748 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1984), affg. 575 F.
Supp. 508 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. United
States, 476 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973). According to petitioners,
the principle of equality precludes the Commissioner from making
arbitrary distinctions between like cases. See Baker v.
Page: Previous 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011