15
refund claim they had based on the return. Sec. 6511(d)(2)(A).
Because the overpayment arose from an NOL carryback, petitioners
had to file a refund claim on or before August 15, 1993. Id.
Petitioners did not file a written claim for refund, nor did they
raise the issue on their 1986 or 1989 returns. The statute
therefore bars the claim unless petitioners can prove that: (1)
They filed an "informal claim" putting the IRS on notice of their
refund claim; (2) the IRS is equitably estopped from raising a
statute of limitations defense; or (3) the period of limitations
is equitably tolled.3
The validity of certain informal refund claims has long been
recognized by the Supreme Court:
a notice fairly advising the Commissioner of the nature of
the taxpayer's claim, which the Commissioner could reject
because too general or because it does not comply with
formal requirements of the statute and regulations, will
nevertheless be treated as a claim, where formal defects and
lack of specificity have been remedied by amendment filed
after the lapse of the statutory period. * * *
United States v. Kales, 314 U.S. 186, 194 (1941). "[I]n order to
be valid, an informal claim must have a written component which
adequately notifies the * * * [IRS] that a refund is sought for a
particular year." Alisa v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1976-255;
see also Mills v. United States, 890 F.2d 1133, 1135 (11th Cir.
3 As an initial matter, the Court notes that the IRS cannot
waive the statute of limitations. Vishnevsky v. United States,
581 F.2d 1249, 1252-1253 (7th Cir. 1978); Essex v. Vinal, 499
F.2d 226, 231 (8th Cir. 1974). There is no contention in this
case that the IRS agreed to extend the statutory period of
limitations.
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