Hospital Corporation of America and Subsidiaries - Page 47

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               The parties’ briefs also extensively debated the question of           
          whether petitioners’ sales of medical supplies are sales of                 
          merchandise which would require the maintenance of inventories              
          and an overall accrual method of accounting.  Specifically,                 
          petitioners contend that the large inventories of medical                   
          supplies maintained by the hospitals are not merchandise sold to            
          patients.  They argue that their hospitals are engaged in service           
          businesses and that such supplies do not fit the definition of              
          merchandise, i.e., goods acquired or produced for sale to                   
          customers in the ordinary course of business at a profit, but are           
          merely items used in the course of providing medical services.              
          Accordingly, petitioners maintain that the hospitals are not                
          required to use an accrual method of accounting for their medical           
          supplies.  Alternatively, petitioners contend that, even if the             
          medical supplies are merchandise, the hybrid method as further              
          modified specifically is permitted under respondent's regulations           
          and clearly reflects the income of the hospitals.                           
               Respondent contends, on the other hand, that section 471               
          does not require that merchandise be sold, only that it be                  
          purchased and then used in some way to produce income.                      
          Accordingly, respondent contends that section 1.471-1, Income Tax           


          22(...continued)                                                            
          446(e) is generally not required” (citing Silver Queen Motel v.             
          Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1101 (1971) and Foley v. Commissioner, 56             
          T.C. 765 (1971))).                                                          





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