- 7 - Constitution." Ward v. Commissioner, supra (citing Ianniello v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 165 (1992)). Kurth Ranch was also distinguished very recently in Price v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-204, where this Court pointed out that the addition for civil fraud "was imposed primarily to protect the revenue and to reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398, 401 (1938); Ianniello v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 165, 176-185 (1992)." Finally, two Courts of Appeals have even more recently rejected the contention that the so-called civil fraud penalty brings into play the double jeopardy provisions. In Grimes v. Commissioner, F.3d , (9th Cir., Apr. 17, 1996), the Ninth Circuit stated: Grimes argues that the imposition of fraud penalties renders the proceeding quasi-criminal. Two recent Supreme Court cases addressing the definition of "punishment" for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause give this argument a superficial appeal. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (1994) (finding that a Montana state tax on marijuana constitutes punishment); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (the "civil" label does not determine whether a sanction is punishment). Both of these decisions, however, cite with approval Helvering v. Mitchell, [38-1 USTC � 9152], 303 U.S. 391 (1938), where the Court found the Tax Code's civil fraud penalty remedial in nature and not punitive for double jeopardy purposes. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1946 n. 16; Halper, 490 U.S. at 442-43. [Fn. ref. omitted.]Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011