- 7 -
Constitution." Ward v. Commissioner, supra (citing Ianniello v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 165 (1992)). Kurth Ranch was also
distinguished very recently in Price v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1996-204, where this Court pointed out that the addition for
civil fraud "was imposed primarily to protect the revenue and to
reimburse the Government for the heavy expense of investigation
and the loss resulting from the taxpayer's fraud. Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398, 401 (1938); Ianniello v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 165, 176-185 (1992)."
Finally, two Courts of Appeals have even more recently
rejected the contention that the so-called civil fraud penalty
brings into play the double jeopardy provisions. In Grimes v.
Commissioner, F.3d , (9th Cir., Apr. 17, 1996), the
Ninth Circuit stated:
Grimes argues that the imposition of fraud penalties
renders the proceeding quasi-criminal. Two recent
Supreme Court cases addressing the definition of
"punishment" for the purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause give this argument a superficial appeal. See
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937,
1948 (1994) (finding that a Montana state tax on
marijuana constitutes punishment); United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (the "civil" label does not
determine whether a sanction is punishment).
Both of these decisions, however, cite with
approval Helvering v. Mitchell, [38-1 USTC � 9152], 303
U.S. 391 (1938), where the Court found the Tax Code's
civil fraud penalty remedial in nature and not punitive
for double jeopardy purposes. See Kurth Ranch, 114 S.
Ct. at 1946 n. 16; Halper, 490 U.S. at 442-43. [Fn.
ref. omitted.]
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