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trust for the benefit of his brother, received consideration from
his brother in the form of a trust for his benefit. In this
context, petitioners' attempt to convert the Court of Appeals'
use of the word "if" to mean "only if" is without merit.
The situations in Mahoney and Lehman are thus clearly
distinguishable7 from the situation herein; McCormick and Furman
received the property and furnished the consideration as trustees
and received no property interest in return.8
In sum, the trust document, along with the purchase
agreement, creates a valid trust under California law, with Meek
as the settlor. McCormick and Furman were simply the conduit
through which Meek transferred property, i.e., his partnership
interest, to the trust and, in effect, fleshed out the missing
link of description which would otherwise have been set forth in
Schedule A of the trust document. In this connection, we note
that the parties have stipulated that by virtue of the purchase
agreement, Meek "sold his 83 percent partnership interest in
Elgarde, Ltd. to the Meek Trust" (emphasis added). We conclude
that Meek was engaged in a transaction between a grantor and
7 Similar reasoning distinguishes Ballard v. MacCallum, 101 P.2d
692 (Cal. 1940).
8 If petitioners' position herein were correct, it would seem to
follow McCormick and Furman could personally be held liable on
the purchase note that they furnished as trustees, a result which
we think it unlikely any California court would countenance.
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