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be unjust to allow one party to benefit from some aspects of a
transaction when another party can't derive the benefits of other
aspects of that same transaction merely because of the presence
of some procedural bar. Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 265 n.2
(1993); Rothensies v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 329 U.S. at
299; In re Peterson Distrib., Inc., 82 F.3d 956, 961 (10th Cir.
1996); In re B & L Oil Co., 782 F.2d 155, 159 (10th Cir. 1986)
(cited approvingly for extent to which recoupment is available in
bankruptcy in Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. at 265 n.2 ); In re
Centergas, Inc., 172 Bankr. 844, 849 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994). To
the extent that the object of inconsistent taxation was not a
part of the same transaction, to that extent justice requires
less insistently that it be treated consistently, and this is
what explains the single-transaction requirement. There is no
such connection between the rationale of equitable recoupment and
the majority's expansive interpretation of the requirement that
recoupment be defensive. Rather, the majority's reasoning
prevents justice from being rendered in view of the one
transaction as a whole and thereby thwarts the purpose of
equitable recoupment, not only in this case but probably in
future cases where such a result would be even more clearly
unjust.
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