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deferral sought by the Executor is directly contrary to the terms
of the parties' Stipulation. Subsequent to that case, Congress
provided an alternative for relief in similar cases. See sec.
7481(d); Rule 262.
Executor agreed with respondent to settle the case according
to the terms of that Stipulation. Two of these terms are that:
(1) “Petitioner shall produce the documentation necessary to
substantiate the [additional administration] expenses referred to
in paragraph 4(b) on or before January 15, 1996," and (2) “A
decision document in the above-entitled case shall be filed on or
before April 15, 1996.” In entering into these terms, as well as
the Stipulation in general, both Executor and respondent agreed
to concede some rights which each might have asserted against the
other. See Saigh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 171, 177 (1956). The
Stipulation, like a contract, binds both parties to the terms
thereof, Stamos v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1451, 1455 (1986), and
must be enforced by this Court unless justice requires that we do
otherwise, see Adams v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 359, 375 (1985);
Sennett v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 694 (1978); Saigh v.
Commissioner, supra. Under the facts at hand, justice does not
require that we do otherwise. The Stipulation, voluntarily
entered in to as a settlement of this lawsuit, must be given
binding effect. The parties struck a bargain in the Stipulation,
and Executor must live with the benefits and burdens of it.
Accordingly, we will grant respondent’s motion for entry of
decision based on her proposed decision. We have considered all
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