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general contract principles, does not convince us that his
interpretation is correct. When the Court asked petitioner
whether he assumed or intended that the provision meant that
payment would be made by the transfer of registered shorthorn
heifers, he responded "I wouldn't characterize it that way". He
testified that he did not designate, in the provision of the
agreement, the class of cattle with which he intended to make
payment in the provision because he was focusing on trying to
draft a document for the basis of settlement. We find that,
although the agreement does not provide a specific method of
payment on the notes, the parties have stipulated that the
payments were made by the transfer of cattle.
Ordinarily, a stipulation of fact is binding on the parties,
and the Court is constrained to enforce it. Rule 91. The Court
will not permit a party to a stipulation to qualify, change, or
contradict the stipulation except where justice requires. Rule
91(e). The interpretation of a stipulation is determined
primarily by ascertaining the intent of the parties by applying
rules of contract law. Stamos v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1451,
1455 (1986).
As we understand petitioner's argument, petitioner claims
that the "cattle" transferred in payment on the notes as
stipulated were not culled cows or calves but were registered
shorthorn heifers, and, therefore, not covered by the agreement.
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