Doris F. Rabenhorst and Alvin P. Rabenhorst, Sr. - Page 8

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          careful review of the record, we conclude that the discounted               
          per-share value of the 1988 stock transfer is $296.                         
               Respondent’s argument is twofold.  First, respondent                   
          contends that the values attributed to the gifts of stock on                
          petitioners’ original gift tax returns constitute admissions on             
          their part and, as such, require “cogent proof” of incorrectness            
          before such values can be reduced.  See, e.g., Estate of Hall v.            
          Commissioner, 92 T.C. 312, 337-338 (1989). Respondent also                  
          contends that Willis was better situated to determine the                   
          appraisal value of the stock transferred than was Chaffe.                   
               Petitioners principally argue that they have carried their             
          burden in establishing that respondent’s determination is                   
          incorrect.  While we agree with respondent that the values                  
          entered on petitioners’ original returns constitute admissions on           
          their part, we find petitioners’ argument persuasive with respect           
          to the fair market value of the 1988 stock transfer.                        
               In Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, supra, we held that                 
          amounts reported on a Federal estate tax return are admissions              
          and that lower values could not be substituted absent “cogent               
          proof” that the reported values were erroneous.  We have also               
          applied this same principle to cases involving Federal gift tax             
          returns.  See Mooneyham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-178.  In           
          the present context, however, this cogent proof principle is                
          essentially synonymous with the general burden of proof set forth           
          in Rule 142(a).  See generally Frazee v. Commissioner, 98 T.C.              




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