- 20 -
(Vol. 3) 1, 804-806. This provides a broad context in which to
evaluate the impact of the exception for interest on an
indebtedness allocable to the business. Id.
We first address the language of the conference committee
report. Respondent argues that the word "generally" was intended
only to permit deduction of interest on past-due business taxes,
such as sales and excise taxes which the regulations specifically
exclude from the definition of personal interest. See sec.
1.163-9T(b)(2)(iii)(A), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 52 Fed. Reg.
48409 (Dec. 22, 1987). On this basis, respondent concludes that
section 1.163-9T(b)(2)(I)(A), Temporary Income Tax Regs., is
reasonable and that additional proof of reasonableness is
provided by the statement in the Joint Committee Staff
Explanation. See supra p. 19. This approach is also articulated
by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Miller v.
United States, 65 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1995), holding the temporary
regulation valid.
We think both respondent and the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit overlook the use of the word "deficiencies" in the
sentence in the conference committee report. That word has had a
long-established and well-known meaning. It has been described
as a "term of art". Bregin v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1097, 1101-
1102 (1980), which describes "deficiency" as a term of art
represented by statutory definition as "the amount by which the
income, gift, or estate tax due under the law exceeds the amount
of such tax shown on the return"; see also Estate of Mueller v.
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