- NEXTRECORD - demonstrates that in 1991 petitioner worked as a barber and received taxable income in that capacity. Cf. Portillo v. Commissioner, 932 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1991); Senter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-311. Second, bank deposits are prima facie evidence of income. Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986); Estate of Mason v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 651, 656-657 (1975), affd. 566 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1977); see Price v. United States, 335 F.2d 671, 677 (5th Cir. 1964) ("The 'bank deposits' method assumes * * * that all money deposited in a taxpayer's bank account during a given period constitutes taxable income.") Accordingly, petitioner bears the burden of proving that respondent's determination of income based on the bank deposits method is erroneous. Clayton v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 632, 645 (1994); DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 868 (1991), affd. 959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992); see Calhoun v. United States, 591 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1978) (taxpayer's burden to prove that unexplained bank deposits came from a nontaxable source). We turn now to the three issues for decision. Issue (1): Unreported Self-employment Income Petitioner does not contest respondent's determination regarding the amount of net deposits to his bank accounts in 1991.6 Rather, petitioner contends that what appear to be unexplained bank deposits are actually nontaxable reimbursements 6 As previously stated, the documentary evidence introduced at trial corroborates respondent's determination of net deposits.Page: Previous 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 Next
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