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were intended to be other than purchases. The acquisition
documents, but for the use of the terms “rent” and “lease”,
contain language that is more indicative of purchases than of
leases, and Mr. Tillman, by his own actions, represented himself
to third parties (including the Internal Revenue Service) as a
purchaser of the trucks. We also find relevant the facts:
(1) The agreement underlying the acquisition of the 1986
Peterbilt provided that Mr. Tillman would “purchase” the truck
upon his payment of the total “rent”, and (2) the total “rent”
was a close approximation of the total amount that Mr. Tillman
would have had to have paid had he financed the truck’s purchase
with a financial lender.5 The fact that a purported lessee will
pay a nominal fee to acquire “leased” property upon the
expiration of the “lease” tends to show that the property was
actually sold to him or her, M & W Gear Co. v. Commissioner,
54 T.C. 385, 395 (1970), affd. on this issue 446 F.2d 841 (7th
Cir. 1971), and the fact that no payment is required, as is true
with the case at hand, tends to show the same. We hold for
respondent on this issue.6
5 The parties have stipulated that Mr. Tillman would have
been required to make 60 monthly payments of $1,604, had he
purchased the 1986 Peterbilt with a 20-percent downpayment and
financed the rest at an interest rate of 14.5 percent.
6 We also note that Mr. Tillman’s rental payments are not
deductible under sec. 162(a)(3). Sec. 162(a)(3) allows a
deduction for rental payments for the use or possession of
property to which the taxpayer has not taken title, or is not
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