- 122 - environment outlined by Pohlschroeder in his memorandum, it held Southampton's exposure at this level until September 1990. One might suppose that if the LIBOR Notes were acquired for their utility to Colgate as a hedge within the partnership it was because, even if Colgate might have desired leveraged exposure to treasury risk at the outset, at some point in the future when a rise in interest rates appeared imminent it would wish to minimize its exposure. Yet, before the LIBOR Notes were acquired, Colgate and Merrill had planned for the immediate disposal of 30 percent of them. The timing of the acquisition and disposition of the LIBOR Notes bore no relationship to Colgate's interest rate expectations. If Colgate had intended to use the LIBOR Notes for protection against rising interest rates, they would not have been a cost-effective instrument for this purpose. Colgate appears to have had no reason to believe otherwise. In an undated document entitled "Risk Allocation Analysis" that seems to have been prepared for Colgate in late October or November, before the LIBOR Notes were acquired, Merrill estimated that a 200 basis point increase in interest rates would cause $35 million market value of LIBOR Notes to appreciate to $40.31 million. This appreciation of just over 15 percent would offset less than half of the devaluation of the Colgate bonds. Southampton's original 17.07 percent pro rata share of the gainPage: Previous 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 Next
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