Alumax Inc. and Consolidated Subsidiaries - Page 59

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          section 1504(a)(1).  Respondent contends that although in                   
               the vast majority of cases applying section 1504(a),                   
               voting power can and should be measured by reference to                
               the election of directors * * *, in an aggressively                    
               structured transaction like the instant case, election                 
               of directors is not an appropriate measure of voting                   
               power.  In such a case, the Service will look beyond                   
               the election of directors to determine voting power.                   
               Respondent argues that "all judicial and administrative                
          authorities" that have construed the meaning of the terms "voting           
          stock" and/or "voting power" for purposes of section 1504(a) and            
          its predecessor provisions in the Internal Revenue laws support             
          respondent's position in the present case.  According to respon-            
          dent, those cases and rulings "disavow [petitioners'] * * *                 
          purely mechanical test as the proper standard for voting power              
          under section 1504(a)."  While acknowledging that the pertinent             
          case law and rulings require the Court in the present case to               
          consider the right of the Alumax class C common stock to elect              
          the class C directors and the voting power of those directors in            
          resolving the issue presented under section 1504(a)(1), respon-             
          dent contends that those cases and rulings also permit us in the            
          instant case to examine the voting power of the class C directors           
          on all board matters, not, as petitioners urge, just on those               
          board matters on which the directors were to vote in the aggre-             
          gate, and not by class.  Respondent further contends that we must           
          also consider the impact of the class voting required by the                
          Alumax stockholders on the same restricted matters on which the             






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