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statute speaks in those terms. As stated by the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 217 (1984):
Our duty then is "to find that interpretation which can
most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in
the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and
with the general purposes that Congress manifested."
NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). * * *
Petitioner would have us read into section 6038A(e) the
additional requirement that petitioner be a reporting corporation
at the time the request for authorization of agent is made upon
it by the IRS. If the statute could be rendered inapplicable by
subsequent ownership changes in a reporting corporation, then it
might lose a substantial part of its efficacy for its stated
purpose. A subsequent change of ownership in the reporting
corporation, after the taxable year containing the transactions
in question, does not insulate petitioner from the application of
section 6038A(e).
Petitioner further contends that "Section 6038A is not
operative because it was a legal impossibility for Petitioner to
obtain the authorization of agent." More accurately stated,
petitioner contends that it was not able to compel its onetime
parent to provide the authorization of agent. A subsidiary is
generally not in the position to compel its parent to perform any
act; such is the nature of a parent/subsidiary relationship. The
legislative history to section 6038A discusses the situation
where a related party, which is not known to be such by the
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