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Ball never asserted a claim for personal injuries (or any other
claim) against Revlon. See Glynn v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 116,
121 (1981) (stating "Here, no claim for personal injury was ever
made."), affd. without published opinion 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir.
1982). Moreover, petitioners did not establish that the amounts
received were intended to compensate for a tort claim relating to
personal injuries sustained by Ms. Ball. To the contrary, the
agreement encompassed any claim arising "under any federal, state
or local statute * * *, regulation or ordinance, under the common
law or in equity * * *, or under any policy, agreement,
understanding, or promise, written or oral, formal or informal,
between" Revlon and Ms. Ball. Thus, the agreement contained a
general release which encompassed a wide variety of potential
tort and contract claims. Therefore, petitioners have failed to
establish that the payments were received on account of personal
injuries and were attributable to a claim based on tort or tort
type rights. Accordingly, we hold that the $8,705.59 is not
excludable from petitioners' gross income.
All other arguments made by the parties are either
irrelevant or without merit.
To reflect concessions,
Decision will be entered
for respondent.
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Last modified: May 25, 2011