- 6 -
Accordingly, petitioners contend that the statutory 90-day filing
period should not begin until petitioners actually received the
notices of deficiency.
Petitioners' reliance on Gaw v. Commissioner, supra, and
Crawford v. Commissioner, supra, is misplaced. In each of those
cases, the taxpayer did not receive the notice of deficiency
prior to the end of the 90-day period allowed for filing a
petition in this Court. Gaw v. Commissioner, supra at 464
(notice of deficiency not received by the taxpayer because it was
returned by the taxpayer's apartment manager to the
Commissioner); Crawford v. Commissioner, supra (notice of
deficiency returned to the Commissioner marked "UNABLE TO
FORWARD"). In the instant cases, however, petitioners concede
that they actually received the notices of deficiency prior to
the end of such 90-day period. As we stated supra, a taxpayer's
actual receipt of a notice of deficiency, without prejudicial
delay, obviates the need to consider a taxpayer's "last known
address" pursuant to section 6212(b)(1). Accordingly, the issue
to be decided is whether petitioners' receipt of the notices of
deficiency 21 days after they were mailed by respondent
constitutes "prejudicial delay".
Based upon our review of the records in the instant cases,
we conclude that the notices of deficiency were received by
petitioners without prejudicial delay. Petitioners concede that
they received the notices of deficiency on or about June 28,
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011