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construed the intent of the parties to the consent based
upon the plain meaning of the words used in the consent.
See United States v. Hodgekins, 28 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir.
1994).
In their cross-motion for summary judgment,
petitioners continue to assert that the consent is "clear
and ambiguous [sic] on its face and therefore must be
strictly construed in accordance with its own terms."
Thus, petitioners do not argue that the consent is
ambiguous, that a mutual mistake was made, or that there
is any other reason to consider extraneous evidence in
determining the intention of the parties to the consent.
See, e.g., Woods v. Commissioner, supra. Accordingly,
we have no reason to consider the "new and additional
information" submitted by petitioners or to reconsider
our opinion in Brody I.
Even if we were to consider the "new and additional
information" submitted by petitioners, the result would
be the same as the result in Brody I. Generally, in
determining whether the parties to a consent to extend the
period of limitations have reached "agreement", as required
by section 6501(c)(4), courts look to the objective mani-
festation of mutual assent as evidenced by the parties'
overt acts and do not take into account the parties' secret
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