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line with the amount that the county paid generally for
development rights under the Program and, thus, represented the
fair market value of the easement. Respondent relies on section
1.170A-14(h)(3)(i), Income Tax Regs., which prescribes a
methodology for determining the fair market value of donated
easements of the type conveyed by petitioners to the county.
Respondent argues that there is a universe of sales of
development rights to the county under the Program, that that
universe constitutes a substantial record of sales of comparable
development rights, and that there were no other sales of
development rights in the county during 1990. Relying on section
1.170A-14(h)(3)(i), Income Tax Regs., respondent denies the
relevance of any appraisal evidence that would support any
different (greater) fair market value. Thus, by, in effect,
defining the fair market value of the property transferred by
what the county paid for it, respondent denies that petitioners
made a bargain sale to the county; denying that they made a
bargain sale, respondent denies that they made a charitable
contribution.
Alternatively, respondent argues that the fair market value
of the easement is no greater than $367,000 and that the
“valuable benefits” received by petitioners, including the
$309,000 and the anticipated charitable contribution deductions,
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