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Having so held, we do not reach the question of whether the
Decree clearly specifies facts as required by section 414(p)(2),
or alters the amount, form, etc., of the benefits, as prohibited
by section 414(p)(3).
In Hawkins v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1996),
the Court of Appeals disagreed with our holding in Hawkins v.
Commissioner, 102 T.C. 61 (1994), that the domestic relations
order in that case did not create or recognize the existence of
an alternate payee's right, or assign to an alternate payee the
right, to receive employee plan benefits, and did not satisfy the
clearly specified facts requirement of section 414(p)(2).
However, in that case the disputed domestic relations order
preceded the plan distribution, which makes this case
distinguishable from Hawkins in a way that is fatal to
petitioner's position. The Court of Appeals in Hawkins v.
Commissioner, 86 F.3d at 990-991, itself recognized a similar
disabling distinction under the facts of Karem v. Commissioner,
100 T.C. 521, 523 (1993):
In Karem [v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 521 (1993)], a consent
judgment was entered by a state divorce court in order to
partition the community property of Mr. and Mrs. Karem. 100
T.C. at 523. The consent judgment provided that Mrs. Karem
was to receive an interest in her ex-husband's pension plan,
but it stated the following condition:
"She shall receive that interest pursuant to a
qualified Domestic Relations Order to be prepared by
Robert Louis Karem. Until the Qualified Domestic
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