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together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be
rendered as a matter of law." Rule 121(b); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Sundstrand Corp. v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th
Cir. 1994); Zaentz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753, 754 (1988);
Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985).
Because the issue is purely legal, this case is ripe for
summary judgment. Timeworn discredited arguments that wages are
not taxable income suffice, as an alternative to dismissal, to
justify summary judgment for respondent. Coleman v.
Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1986) (wages not income);
Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766, 772-774 (1984) (wages not
income), affd. per curiam 793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986); Cornell
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-370 (wages not income), see also
Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417 (5th Cir. 1984). There is
no need for us to spend any time on the arguments in petitioner’s
“Memorandum of Law”. Petitioner should read the foregoing cases,
if she has not already done so. We therefore grant respondent’s
motion for summary judgment, sustaining all of respondent’s
determinations, and deny petitioner’s motion.
We now raise sua sponte whether we should impose a penalty
under section 6673(a) against petitioner on the ground that
petitioner instituted or maintained the proceeding primarily for
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