Collin L. Dugan - Page 20

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          to Rev. Rul. 74-150, 1974-1 C.B. 241 (which concluded that                  
          unnecessary, albeit erroneous, information contained on a Form              
          2553 did not adversely effect the validity of the election), and            
          also contrary to the line of cases addressing the effective dates           
          of S corporation elections in situations where the taxpayers                
          omitted essential information from Forms 2553.  Returning the               
          Form 2553 was consistent with the instructions in the manual,               
          which instructions were consistent with the body of law                     
          previously discussed, see supra pp. 15-17, and cannot be                    
          considered unreasonable under the circumstances.                            
               We have observed in numerous opinions that the                         
          Commissioner's concession of an issue is not determinative of               
          whether the Commissioner's position in the proceeding was                   
          substantially justified, Sokol v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 760, 767            
          (1989); Wasie v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 962, 968-969 (1986), but             
          merely a factor to be considered, Estate of Perry v.                        
          Commissioner, 931 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1991).                          
               After considering the surrounding circumstances, we find               
          that petitioner has failed to establish that respondent's                   
          position disallowing the NTI passthrough loss claimed by                    
          petitioner and Mrs. Dugan in 1991 (a portion of which was carried           
          back to 1988) because NTI's S corporation election was not                  
          effective until 1993 was not substantially justified.                       
          Consequently, petitioner cannot be considered a prevailing party            
          within the meaning of section 7430(a).                                      




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