- 11 -
Petitioner seems to suggest that these cases stand for the
proposition that section 215, which allows a deduction for
alimony or separate maintenance payments, provides the exclusive
means for deducting a payment from one spouse to another, if the
payment is made pursuant to a divorce. From this petitioner
concludes that section 71 must be the exclusive means by which
one spouse can receive income from the other. Neither the
premise nor the conclusion is correct. As previously indicated,
gross income is broadly defined to include income from any source
derived. Sec. 61(a); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
U.S. 426 (1955). Deductions, on the other hand, are a matter of
legislative grace. A taxpayer claiming a deduction must
establish the statutory basis for the deduction and demonstrate
that all of the requirements of the relevant statute have been
satisfied. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440
(1934). The cases relied upon by petitioner focus upon the
allowance of deductions claimed by the payor/taxpayers rather
than the characterization of the payments to the recipients.
Lastly, petitioner argues that it would be unfair to require
her to include the interest payments in her income. She
maintains that she will have received less than she was entitled
to receive under the divorce decree if the interest payments must
be included in her income. Separate and apart from our inability
to grant relief to a taxpayer because the imposition of a Federal
income tax law results in some harshness or unfairness, Estate of
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011