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Bernstein v. Centaur Ins. Co., 644 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (plaintiffs could not reasonably rely on apparent authority
of vice president of one of defendant's subsidiaries to bind
defendant, when plaintiffs had actual notice that the vice
president was no longer employed by the subsidiary); Baker v.
McCue-Moyle Dev. Co., 695 S.W.2d 906, 912 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(warranty deed not legal tender because when it was presented,
the buyer knew that the partner who signed it no longer had
authority to sign, as the other partner had notified the buyer of
the dispute. Further, the buyer had no duty to express his
reasons for objecting to the deed because they were obvious.);
In re Wolf Creek Valley Metro. Dist. No. IV, 138 Bankr. 610, 618
(D. Colo. 1992) (even if a friend had served as an agent in the
past, that relationship was clearly terminated when the friend
explicitly notified corporate property owner that he could no
longer serve as an intermediary between the parties).
We need not discuss Bergman’s first letter because we
believe the second letter and the Form 872 signed in 1992 are
dispositive. The second letter says, “Because Mr. Halper is
presently not competent to authorize my agreement * * * I cannot
sign the Form 870 which you have enclosed.” (Emphasis added.)
Respondent focuses on the word “presently” as casting doubt
on petitioner’s condition. However, we do not see any ambiguity.
We think, rather, the word is simply used to distinguish between
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