- 104 -
component. Nonetheless, in S. Rept. 95-1263 (see supra note 48)
Congress recognized that "special lighting" which has no more
than an incidental relationship to the operation or maintenance
of a building constitutes personal property. E.g., Metro Natl.
Corp. v. Commissioner, supra (decorative lighting and plant grow
lights). Lighting which serves as an accessory to a business
also constitutes personal property. Id. (security lighting
illuminating the outside perimeter of a building housing a
psychiatric facility). In Morrison v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1986-129, we held that the taxpayers' emergency lighting
constituted personal property and noted that lighting fixtures
and electrical connections that "do not provide basic
illumination" and that are "accessory to a business" do not
constitute structural components of a building. Id.
Respondent contends that the overbed lights are not similar
to the emergency lights involved in Morrison, Inc. v.
Commissioner, but are ordinary fluorescent fixtures which provide
general room illumination. We agree.
We are not persuaded that the overbed lights are "special
lighting" within the meaning of S. Rept. 95-1263, supra, 1978-3
C.B. (Vol. 1) at 415, or that they constitute an asset accessory
to a business within the meaning of S. Rept. 1881, supra, 1962-3
C.B. at 722. The overbed lights are standard 4-tube florescent
light fixtures placed in the acoustical ceilings of the hospital
buildings. Photographs contained in the record reveal that the
Page: Previous 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 NextLast modified: May 25, 2011