- 13 - small number of employees so that no one else had access to an actual signature to trace or simulate; the fact that the Form 2553, when returned to the JPS address for additional information, was promptly resubmitted with extensive details concerning JPS; and the fact that petitioner was in charge of financial operations. Petitioner puts considerable weight on his affidavit, in which he declares that he did not authorize anyone to sign his name. We need not accept a taxpayer's self-serving testimony as gospel. Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986); Three G Trading Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988- 131 (declining to accept self-serving testimony in a summary judgment case). On the other hand, we may not merely rely on factual assertions in respondent's brief, which are not sufficient to defeat petitioner's motion. Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-706. In this case, however, the scenario that respondent suggests on brief is sufficiently plausible, given the facts in the record, for us to find that petitioner has not made a prima facie showing of the absence of a factual issue. The Form 2553 itself reflects preparation by someone with considerable information concerning JPS's affairs. Therefore, respondent need not come forth with affidavits or other documentary evidence to refute petitioner's position. Abramo v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 154, 163-164 (1982); Rosberg v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-267. We find that there is aPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Next
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