been utilized. Thus, at the end of 1991, the 1990 NOL was not
available to petitioners as a carryforward.2 Indeed, petitioners
do not contend otherwise.
Second, we consider the question whether, as petitioners
contend, the 1990 NOL was extant at the time of Mr. Kahle's
discharge and became available as a carryback to 1991. Here
again, the answer is clearly in the negative. Section 108(d)(8)
applies to section 108(b)(1). Section 108(b)(1) refers to
reductions provided for in section 108(b)(2). Thus the reduction
which occurs under section 108(b) is determined by the bankrupt
estate, not the individual debtor. Section 108(d)(8) does not
specifically refer to section 108(b)(4) because section 108(b)(4)
does not actually refer to a taxpayer but only to the
determination of tax liability. Thus, the estate may use the tax
attributes to determine its tax liability for the year of
discharge, after which the tax attributes are reduced by the
estate under section 108(b)(2), before being returned to the
debtor-taxpayer.
Such a reading comports with the overall purpose of the
statutory scheme. It is clear from the statute that the price
the debtor-taxpayer pays for not including in income the amount
of the discharged debt is the surrender of certain enumerated tax
attributes, as provided for in sections 108(b)(1) and 1398(g) and
(i). The legislative history confirms this view when it states:
2 See Beery v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-464.
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