Randall L. Kirst and Mary M. Kirst - Page 7

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           relates back to the date of the purported oral agreement.3  The                            
           authority upon which petitioners rely does not espouse their                               
           argument.  See Marriage of Garrity, 181 Cal. App. 3d. 675 (Ct.                             
           App. 1986).  Suffice it to say that the Federal tax law cannot be                          
           circumvented in the manner advocated by petitioners.4                                      
                 Mr. Kirst failed to obtain record title to the Newport Beach                         
           property during the replacement period.  This alone prevents                               
           petitioners from deferring the gain realized from the sale of the                          
           Sepulveda property.  As explained above, continuity of title is                            
           essential if a taxpayer is to receive nonrecognition treatment                             
           under section 1034.  Marcello v. Commissioner, supra; Boesel v.                            
           Commissioner, supra.                                                                       







                 3It is interesting to note that petitioners' argument is                             
           inconsistent with the evidence of record.  That is, petitioners                            
           maintain that, in exchange for certain consideration, Mrs. Kirst                           
           orally agreed in September 1989 to transmute an interest in the                            
           Newport Beach property to Mr. Kirst.  According to petitioners,                            
           that "exchange" occurred on April 27, 1990.  However, when                                 
           petitioners completed Form 2119, which was attached to their                               
           timely filed return for 1990 and was presumably prepared in 1991,                          
           they indicated that Mr. Kirst had yet to purchase a replacement                            
           principal residence.  Petitioners fail to explain why the Form                             
           2119 indicates that Mr. Kirst had yet to purchase a replacement                            
           principal residence, while petitioners now argue that the                                  
           exchange or transmutation involved in their agreement occurred in                          
           April 1990.                                                                                
                 4We do not consider the effect of a written transmutation                            
           agreement that is executed during the replacement period.                                  




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