Stanley M. Kurzet and Anne L. Kurzet - Page 46

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            are not deductible under either section 162 or 212.  See sec. 262.                        
            Lear Jet                                                                                  
                  Petitioners have not satisfied their burden of proving that                         
            the large expenses of operating the Lear jet qualify as ordinary                          
            and necessary business expenses of petitioners' timber farm, of                           
            petitioner’s consulting business, or of petitioner's computer                             
            and real estate rental businesses.  The expenses of purchasing,                           
            maintaining, and operating a personal Lear jet to make a few                              
            trips each year to Oregon and to Utah appear extraordinary.  On                           
            the facts of this case, such expenses do not constitute ordinary                          
            and necessary expenses of any of petitioners’ business                                    
            activities.                                                                               
                  Further, because the Tahiti Property does not qualify as a                          
            business or for-profit activity, petitioners' transportation to                           
            Tahiti in the Lear jet does not qualify as anything other than                            
            personal travel.  The large transportation expenses (including                            
            significant noncash expenses such as depreciation) associated                             
            with the Lear jet appear to be out of the ordinary and to be                              
            unnecessary particularly in light of the fact that petitioners'                           
            timber farm was not producing any current income (due to                                  
            petitioner's decision to defer cutting any of the timber) and to                          
            the fact that the Tahiti Property, as we have held, did not                               
            constitute a for-profit activity.  See Commissioner v.                                    
            Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 469 (1943), as to the factual nature of                          
            this issue.                                                                               




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